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ABSTRACT  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the factors that can influence the growth and 
development of the economy of a country, but on the other hand, it could have a 
negative effect if not regulated properly by the host country. States must ensure that 
FDI is properly regulated in the best interests of the country and the foreign investor 
itself. South Africa has reviewed its foreign investment legal framework and during this 
process, it terminated most of its bilateral investment treaties that previously regulated 
foreign investment in the country. In turn, it introduced the Protection of Protection of 
Investment Act that regulates both domestic and foreign investment. This study 
analyses the way in which national and international investment law affect FDI inflow 
and the economy of South Africa. The study also deals with the determinants of foreign 
investment in the host country and the extent to which they have an influence on the 
inflow of FDI. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, Domestic investor, Economic development, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Foreign investor, Gross Domestic Product, International Economic Law,  
International   Minimum Standard of Treatment, Protection of Protection of Investment 
Act, South Africa, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
BIT  Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BOR  Bill of Rights 
CAIC  China Administration for Industry and Commerce 
DA  Democratic Alliance 
DIRCO Department of International Relations and Co-operation 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry 
EFF  Economic Freedom Fighters 
FCN  Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FET  Fair and Equitable Treatment 
FTA   Free Trade Agreement  
GA  General Assembly 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICSID  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IIA  International Investment Agreement 
ILC  International Law Commission  
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IMST  International Minimum Standard of Treatment 
ITO  International Trade Organisation 
MIGA  Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
MMLC Management Markets and Legal Consulting  
MPRDA Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
MST  Minimum Standard of Treatment 
NA  National Assembly 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement  
NCOP  National Council of Provinces 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PCA  Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PCIJ  Permanent Court of International Justice 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
SAECR South African Exchange Control Regulation 
SAGNA South African Government News Agency 
SAHO  South African History Online  
SAIRR South African Institute of Race and Relations 
TDCA  Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement  
UK  United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
USA  United States of America 
VC  Vienna Convention 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Firstly, I would like to thank the almighty God for life and for the provision of life. It is 
not because I deserve it, but because He is a good God of grace. 
 
Secondly, I would like to extend my sincere and heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor 
Prof Schulze. His guidance, support, patience, invaluable advice and scholarly 
guidance are the main reason why I managed to complete this study. 
 
Thirdly, I would like to thank the Department of Public, Constitutional and International 
Law Department (PCI Law Department) for affording me this opportunity to do my 
masters in the Department. Furthermore, I would like to thank the PCI Law Department 
for understanding that I was a student and for granting me study leave to do my 
research whenever the need arose.  
 
Lastly, yet importantly, I would also like to thank my family. My father, Mr Fannie  
Mhlongo and my brother, Mr Tlangelani Mhlongo, for their encouragement and support 
whenever I was overwhelmed with my studies. They kept me going on days when I felt 
like quitting.  My sister Memory Mhlongo for her support, understanding and taking 
care of the house while I spent time in the library. She never complained and just made 
sure that everything was in order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
International economic law is one of the realms of law that regulates the international 
investment agreements and economic relations between states and private entities. It 
is a field of international law with its own distinctive characteristics that relates to the 
rules, which address matters that are regarded as part of the exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction of states.1 These characteristics are an indication of the economic 
development of states as structured by the international community.2 
 
International economic law encompasses various areas of law, for example, the 
principles of international trade law, private international law, international law of 
foreign direct investments,3 and legal transactions in international law. This study 
focuses only on the law governing FDI in South Africa. A foreign direct investment is 
an investment made by a state or private individual or a private entity in a foreign 
country for the acquisition of a financial or economic advantage from the asset over a 
period of time.4  
 
The late former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, emphasised the 
importance of FDI in an article that he wrote in 1993 for the Department of Foreign 
Affairs.  
 
Mandela stated the following:  
“It is obvious to me that the primary components of our international economic 
relations, which must feed our development strategy, are the strengthening of 
our trade performance and our capacity to attract foreign investment. In 
addition, we must examine the possibilities of obtaining technical and financial 
assistance from the industrialized countries”. We do not expect foreign 
                                                          
1 Elgar E International Economic Law: Globalisation and Developing Countries (2010) 10-11. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Foreign Direct Investment (hereinafter referred to as the FDI). 
4 Booysen H The Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (2003) 531-532. 
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investment to solve our economic problems, but we understand it can play a 
valuable role in our economic development”.5 
“The ANC believes the most important way to attract foreign investment is to create a 
stable and democratic political environment. Also important is the development of 
legitimate, transparent, and consistent economic policies. Foreign companies should 
be treated as domestic companies, obeying our laws and gaining access to our 
incentives, and the ANC is committed to the principle of uniform treatment. And while 
we do not plan to provide exclusive incentives for all foreign investors, we realize it 
might be necessary to make special arrangements to attract the kind of investment that 
will make a real difference in South Africa”.6 
 
South Africa is one of the developing countries that are often confronted with the 
question of whether to implement or repeal laws that no longer serve the objectives of 
the country. This could be because there is a need for new laws to be implemented or 
for existing laws to be amended should they no longer be consistent with the 
Constitution.7 
 
As a democratic developing country, South Africa has a constitutional obligation to 
secure ecologically sustainable development.8 In order to realise and to fulfil this 
obligation, South Africa has enacted many domestic laws such as the Expropriation 
Act,9 and the Arbitration Act.10 South Africa has entered into many international 
agreements such as the Southern African Development Community Free Trade 
Agreement,11 the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA),12 and 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with a number of foreign countries.13  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Mandela N “South Africa’s future foreign policy” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-
africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy (Date of use: 11 September 2015). 
6 Ibid. 
7 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). 
8 See s 24 of the Constitution. 
9 The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Expropriation Act). 
10 The Arbitration Act 42 of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Arbitration Act). 
11 The Southern African Development Community Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter referred to as 
the SADC FTA). 
12 Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the TDCA). 
13 These are international investment agreements that South Africa has concluded with other 
countries. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
FDI is one of the vehicles that influences the growth and development of the economy 
of a country.14 However, it may also negatively affect the economy of a country. This 
means that states must ensure that FDI is properly regulated in the best interest of the 
country and the foreign investors themselves. For example, a foreign company will be 
reluctant to invest in a country that does not promote its interests. Therefore, the laws 
regulating international investments must be structured in such a way that they provide 
incentives for foreign investors to invest in a certain country.  
There are many factors that affect and have an impact on the behaviour of foreign 
investors towards a host country. Equally so is the competing interest of the host state. 
This means that there has to be an exercise of balancing these competing interests in 
order to create a mutually conducive foreign investment environment, for example, 
governance and security, political stability, openness to regional and international 
trade, competitiveness, local market and international/ global market access, foreign 
direct investment protection, legal and policy requirements for investments, business 
climate and regulatory environment. 
It is generally accepted that when dealing in international commerce, states, private 
individuals and entities prefer the rules of international law over domestic law. The 
reason is that the state may enact laws that are more favourable to the state and its 
nationals than foreign investors. However, on the international plane, parties entering 
into foreign agreements have a wide discretion with regard to many aspects of those 
agreements.  For example, they have the discretion to choose the law that will be 
applicable to their agreements, the competent body that will resolve disputes arising 
from such contracts, and how to treat such agreements in a case where one of the 
party’s laws changes, or where there is no stabilisation clause. This is known as the 
principle of contractual autonomy pertaining to the choice of law.15 
FDI often provides economic growth and sustainable economic development for the 
parties involved.16 A foreign direct investment is an investment made by a state or a 
private individual or a private entity in a foreign country for the purpose of acquiring 
                                                          
14 Booysen H The Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (2003) 429-431. 
15 Woodward W J “The contractual choice of law: legislative choice in an era of party autonomy” 2001 
SMU Law Review 711. 
16  Booysen H The Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (2003) 429-431.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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financial or economic advantage from the asset over a period of time. According to 
Kearney, South Africa ranks as the 13th most attractive destination in the world among 
foreign investors, although in 2013, it still ranked two positions higher.17  
There is a need for foreign investment policies that will not only benefit South Africa 
and its nationals, but that will attract foreign investors and make them to have faith and 
confidence in the country’s legal system to provide the necessary protection in cases 
of dispute. One has to take cognisance of the fact that states have an obligation to 
govern in the public interest, especially at times when laws and policies are adopted 
or repealed. 
This is evident from the case of Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli v Republic of South 
Africa,18 which came before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes19 in 2007. This case challenged certain provisions of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act.20 The proceedings were initiated by the 
claimants under Article 8 of the Italy-SA BIT21 and Article 10 of the Belgo/Luxembourg-
SA BIT.22 These two articles contain similar provisions. 
The claimants averred that certain provisions of the MPRDA and the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act23 amount to acts of expropriation and thus violate 
South Africa’s obligation to provide for a fair and equitable of obligations under the 
Italy-SA Bilateral Investment Treaty. Although the case was dismissed, the South 
African government realised that there might be loopholes in the BITs that South Africa 
had concluded with other countries. This case was the first case to challenge South 
                                                          
17  Kearney A T “Ready for take-off” 2014 Foreign Direct Investment Index 20, available at 
http://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/4572735/Ready+for+Takeoff+-
+FDICI+2014.pdf/e921968a-5bfe-4860-ac51-10ec5c396e95 (Date of use: 01 April 2015). 
18 The Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli V Republic of South Africa ICSID case No ARB (AF)/07/1 
(hereinafter referred to as the Piero Foresti case). 
19 The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the 
ICSID).  The ICSID is an international institution that deals with the resolution of international 
investment disputes. Available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/about/pages/default.aspx  
20 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 49 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 
MPRDA). 
21   The Italy-South Africa Bilateral Investment Treaty, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Italy-SA 
BIT). 
22 The Belgo/Luxembourg-South Africa Bilateral Investment Treaty, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Belgo/Luxembourg-SA BIT). 
23 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 
BEEA). 
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Africa’s obligations with regard to the BITs and as a result, South Africa embarked on 
an investment policies’ review process in 2010. 
The South African government, the DTI and the Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation, after a three-year investment policy review process, made a decision 
to terminate BITs with foreign states and introduced the Protection and Promotion of 
Investment Bill24 in November 2013.25 The Promotion and Protection of Investment 
Bill26 was introduced and later gazetted as the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 
on the 15th of December 2015 and now serves to regulate the protection of foreign 
investment.27 The Protection of Investment Act is not without controversy though.  
 
Foreign governments and private entities have raised concerns with regard to the 
cancellation of South Africa’s BITs, as the cancellations will affect the legal rights of 
foreign investors, whose main concern is security of tenure for their investments. 
Foreign investors are vulnerable when governments promote policy changes that could 
potentially have an adverse effect on the rights and legitimate expectations they have 
for investments.28 On the other hand, South Africa as a host state, needs to promote 
sustainable economic development and promote Black Economic Empowerment29 as 
required by the Constitution. Whereas domestic laws may be amended or changed 
unilaterally by parliament, provisions of BITs cannot. This is because the conclusion of 
BITs internationalise the legal association between the parties.30  
 
 The BITs with most of European countries have already been terminated. South Africa 
has only three BITs in place with the SADC member countries out of the 15 SADC 
                                                          
24 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Protection of 
Investment Bill). 
25 Hurt S “Why South Africa is cancelling foreign investment deals” 
http://www.economywatch.coatures/south-africa-cancelling-foreign-investment.02-01.html  (Date of 
use: 23 October 2014). 
26 The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Investment 
Bill). 
27 Which has however not came into operation as no date has yet been determined by the President 
by proclamation in the Government Gazette.  
28 Drape P and Langalanga A “Does the draft Investment Bill threaten foreign investors’ rights” 
http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/draft-investment-bill-requires-amendment  (Date of use: 18 
March 2016). 
29 Black Economic Empowerment (hereinafter referred to as the BEE). 
30 Booysen H The Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (2003) 210. 
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member states. However, the BITs with the BRICS countries, namely Russia, India and 
China are in force except for Brazil.31 
 
The reason behind the termination of these treaties is that the proposed the Protection 
of Investment Bill will update and modernise South Africa’s legal framework for foreign 
investments,32 while increasing the protection and promotion of both domestic and 
international investments.  
 
The first BITs that South Africa terminated were with Germany, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands. These BITs were concluded by South Africa in the post-1994 era, the so-
called first generation BITs.33 These countries are collectively South Africa’s biggest 
international investors.34  
The reason why South Africa terminated these BITs at that time is that these BITs were 
close to their termination dates and South Africa saw an opportunity to terminate them 
as they would otherwise have been automatically extended in terms of their renewal 
clauses. For example, the South Africa-Germany BIT contains a twelve months’ notice 
period with a run-off protection for existing protected investments of twenty years,35 
while the South Africa-Netherlands BIT contained a six months’ notice period with a 
10-year automatic renewal period and a 15-year run-off period for investments made 
before the termination date.36 The South Africa-UK BIT contained a twelve months’ 
application period after the notice of termination and a 20-year run-off protection period 
for existing investments.37 
                                                          
31 UNCTAD “Number of IIAs per economy” 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 22 May 2015). 
32 Steyn P ”The new Promotion and Protection of investment Bill for local and foreign Investors in 
South Africa”  http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-new-promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-an-
assessment-of-its-implications-for-local-and-foreign-investors-in-south-africa                                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Date of Use: 21 October 2014). 
33  The very first BIT concluded by South Africa in the post-1994 era was with the UK. 
34 SAIRR “Submission to the DTI regarding the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill of 2013 – 
31 January 2015” http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/submissions-on-proposed-
legislation/submission-to-the-dti-regarding-the-promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-of-2013-
2013-31-january-2015 (Date of use: 23 April 2015). 
35 Mossallam M “Process matters: South Africa’s experience exiting its BITs” (University of Oxford: 
The Global Economic Governance Programme 2015)13. 
36 Articles 14(2) and 14(3) of the South Africa-Netherlands Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter 
referred to as the SA-Netherlands BIT). 
37 Articles 14 of the South Africa-United Kingdom BIT (hereinafter referred to as the SA-UK BIT). 
7 
 
On 22 May 2015, South Africa had only 17 BITs in force out of the 40 BITs that were 
concluded in the past.38 On the other hand, China, a developing and a BRICS country 
with a high Gross Domestic Product, has more than 108 BITs in place.39 
The introduction of the Investment Bill became a controversial and heated topic with 
regard to South Africa’s new approach to regulating FDI and investors alike. Foreign 
governments and private entities have raised concerns with regard to the cancellation 
of South Africa’s BITs, as the cancellations will affect the legal rights of foreign 
investors.40 
According to the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Investment Bill is meant to provide 
“adequate protection to all investors, including foreign investors”, and it will ensure that 
“South Africa’s constitutional obligations, like sustainable development,41 are upheld, 
while allowing government to retain the policy space to regulate in the public interest”.42 
He further argues that there is no connection between the growth of South Africa’s 
economy and the BITs,43 although some of these countries are South Africa’s largest 
trading partners.44 
The main concern for foreign investors is security of tenure for their 
investments.  Foreign Investors are vulnerable when governments promote policy 
changes that could potentially have an adverse effect on the rights and legitimate 
expectations they have with regard to their foreign investments.45 On the other hand, 
South Africa as a host state needs to promote sustainable economic development and 
promote BEE as required by the Constitution. Domestic laws may be amended or 
                                                          
38 UNCTAD “Number of IIAs per economy” 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 27 March 2015). 
39 Ibid. 
40 To date no critical comments with regard to the Protection of Investment Act have been published. It 
is for this reason that the criticism that was expressed concerning the Investment Bill is dealt with 
here. Furthermore, most of the provisions of the Investment Bill were subsequently incorporated 
unchanged into the Protection of the Investment Act. 
41 See s 2 of the Constitution. 
42 SAGNA “Bill to help modernise SA's investment regime: Davies” http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-
africa/bill-help-modernise-sas-investment-regime-davies (Date of use: 24 April 2015). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Forde F “Investment Bill: thick as a Brics?”  
http://www.financialmail.co.za/fmfox/2015/11/12/investment-bill-thick-as-a-brics (Date of use: 16 
November 2015). 
45 Drape P and Langalanga A “Does the draft Investment Bill threaten foreign investors’ rights” 
http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/draft-investment-bill-requires-amendment    (Date of use: 18 
March 2015). 
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changed unilaterally by parliament, while provisions of BITs cannot be changed 
unilaterally.  
Nemeth46 argues that the Investment Bill must provide a clear assurance that capital 
relating to investment and returns cannot be repatriated so that the investors should 
not lose their basic rights.47 The European Union Chamber of Commerce48 argues that 
the Investment Bill will not promote or protect the FDI in South Africa.49 The EU 
Chamber pointed out that new investment decisions with South Africa have been put 
on hold, while disinvestment decisions are next on the agenda.50 The EU Chamber of 
Commerce further argues that: 
“By limiting the rights and expectations of committed and long-term investors and the 
predictability of changes which may affect their investments, including expropriation, the 
current Bill could invariably attract short-term investors, who do not pay much attention to 
investment frameworks, either because of the short turnaround time of their investments, or 
because they enjoy other preferential arrangements”.51  
The Investment Bill has been promulgated without major amendments, even though it 
received a negative response from the international investment community. The 
Protection of the Investment Act contains only two of the five common provisions of 
BITs, namely, the national treatment and dispute resolution. The Protection of 
Investment Act is, by its nature, more favourable to domestic investors even though 
the definition of an investor includes both domestic and foreign investors.52  
The government of South Africa has however, adopted some changes to the Protection 
of Investment Act from the Investment Bill. For example, the title of the Protection of 
                                                          
46 Nemeth J is the president of the American Chamber of commerce. 
47 Parly Reports SA “The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill open up a major row” 
http://parlyreportsa.co.za/finance-economic/promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-opens-major-
row/   (Date of use: 18 March 2015). 
48 The European Union Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as the EU Chamber of 
Commerce). 
49 Parly Reports SA “The Bill will not promote or protect investment” 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/this-bill-wont-protect-or-promote-investment--eu-
c?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=c383b1bce0-
DHN_Sept_17_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a86f25db99-c383b1bce0-130082905  (Date 
of use: 18 March 2015). 
50 Forde F “Investment Bill: thick as a Brics?”  
http://www.financialmail.co.za/fmfox/2015/11/12/investment-bill-thick-as-a-brics (Date of use: 16 
November 2015). 
51 Ibid. 
52 The content of the Protection of Investment Act will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 below. 
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Investment Act has also been changed from the ‘Promotion and Protection of 
Investment’ to the ‘Protection of Investment’ 53 as well as the preamble in that it only 
focuses on protecting investments and not promoting and encouraging investments. 
The Protection of Investment Act contains an additional section that was not included 
in the Investment Bill namely, fair administrative treatment.54 The heading of the 
provision dealing with security of investment has been changed from ‘security of 
investment’ to ‘physical security of property’. However, there is no definition of ‘a 
property’ in the Protection of Investment Act. The provision dealing with protection of 
investment has been changed from ‘protection of property’ to ‘legal protection of 
investment’.55  
The BITs also state that compensation for expropriation must be prompt, adequate and 
effective, while in terms of the Investment Bill the compensation is likely to be less than 
the market value.56  The BITs provide for a fair and equitable treatment of foreign 
investments, while the Investment Bill emphasises the government’s sovereign right to 
pursue various policy objectives, and states that the sovereignty right cannot be 
hindered by the investors’ right to be protected.  
In terms of the Investment Bill, the protection of foreign investors is subject to 
applicable domestic legislation,57 rather than international law. The Investment Bill 
must not be interpreted to create a right of establishment for potential or foreign 
investments.58 The Investment Bill further provides that security of investment is 
subject to availability of resources and capacity.59 Furthermore, the Investment Bill 
provides that an aggrieved foreign investor must seek redress through a review by a 
competent domestic court or refer the matter to the domestic dispute resolution 
procedures.  
The dispute resolution in terms of international law depends on whether the matter is 
between private investors, or between the state and a private investor. If the matter is 
between private investors, they can either take the matter on review through 
                                                          
53 See s 16 of the Protection of Investment Act. 
54 Id at 6. 
55 Id at 10. 
56 See s 8(1) of the Investment Bill. 
57 See s 5(1)(a) of the Investment Bill. 
58 See s 5(2) of the Investment Bill. 
59 See s 7(1) of the Investment Bill. 
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international arbitration or diplomatic channels.60 With regard to investor-state dispute 
settlement, the parties to the dispute can either take the matter to international 
arbitration, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) 
or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).61 
By looking at these inconsistencies between the Investment Bill and the BITs, one can 
easily conclude that certain provisions of the Investment Bill will make South Africa a 
non-friendly investment jurisdiction. It does not allow for the diversity and flexibility 
offered by the international investment agreements. The “pull factors” of foreign 
investments such as market size and growth, the quality of the infrastructure, the 
presence of natural resources, the availability of skills and technology are crucial in 
FDI.  
The “pull factors” of investments are very low in South Africa, while the “push factors” 
like economic and social dumping are reasonably high. The introduction of the 
Investment Bill is likely to impair the economy. The South African government has 
already introduced many amendments to the MPRDA, the Labour Relations Act,62 the 
BBBEEA, and the land reform process. 
The flow of the FDI may also be affected by economic and social dumping. This occurs 
where a country lowers the price of one of its sales to operators in the domestic 
market.63 Economic and social dumping defeats the competition opponent to capture 
the market or so that the manufacturers and industry suffered losses.64  In other words, 
“dumping is selling goods at lower value than comparable like products in the market 
they have been sold”.65 Economic sanctions such as disinvestment may also affect the 
flow of the FDI.66 
                                                          
60 See s 11 of the Investment Bill.  
61 International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as the ICC). The ICC is an institution 
that promotes international trade and investment while helping business to meet the challenges of 
globalization. 
62 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA). 
63 Sibanda OS “Can BRICS house stand longer when built on dumping ground? The Impact of South 
Africa’s Anti-Dumping measures BRICS’ Intra-Trade Relations” (Paper delivered at the UNISA 
research Indaba @ Law Retreat, 28-30 April 2015) 3. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Wood R M “A hand upon the throat of the nation: economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–
2001” 2001 SMU Law Review 489. 
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A question arises as to whether the Investment Bill, if approved by parliament, will 
encourage foreign investors to invest in South Africa and thus contribute to the growth 
of the country’s economy. Entering into BITs allows the parties to insert the standard 
of treatment adequate to both parties. Most BITs contain an umbrella clause also 
known as the treatment of state obligation.67 The umbrella clause extends the scope 
and jurisdiction of the application of BITs.68  
 
Taking cognisance of the fact that the South African government has a duty to ensure 
that its nationals benefit from the country’s economic wealth, the question arises as to 
whether the enactment of the Investment Bill fulfils the constitutional requirements 
relating to securing sustainable economic development, and the promotion of 
justifiable economic and social development. Can the enactment of the Investment Bill 
protect and promote foreign investments in SA? 
The government has an obligation to enact laws that will ensure that the entire 
population will actively share in the wealth of the nation derived from the FDI within the 
realm of domestic laws and international trade laws. Therefore laws must be enacted 
in such a way that they protect the interest of international investors and secure 
ecological sustainable development while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.69 States are often confronted with the challenge of addressing their 
domestic political and economic situation while fulfilling their obligations to international 
investors who have invested in the country.70 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
How was foreign direct investment regulated in the pre-1994 era in South Africa? What 
encouraged South Africa to introduce the Investment Bill and phase out the BITs? Is it 
possible to have the investment Bill and BITs operate concurrently and what will be the 
consequences thereof? Will it uphold the constitutional values? Does South Africa 
have a beneficiation strategy?  
 
                                                          
67 The umbrella clause is a clause that is inserted into a BIT by which both parties make a commitment 
to each other to observe any obligation assumed by the conclusion of the BIT. See Salacuse J W The 
law of Investment treaties 271. 
68 Chaisse J and Bellak C “Navigating the expanding of international treaties on foreign investment: 
creation and use of critical index” 2015 Journal of International Economic Law 86-87. 
69 See s 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution. 
70 Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2012) 59. 
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What are the international legal frameworks and standards that South Africa would 
have to comply with in order to enact the Protection of Investment Act? What are the 
international legal frameworks required to regulate FDI in a manner that will promote 
sustainable economic development and protect foreign investment in terms of section 
24 of the Constitution? Why do developing countries with few nationals who are 
unlikely to invest abroad sign investment treaties with developed counties, which have 
the effect of restraining government’s actions in their dealing with foreign investors? 
Will the FDI flow increase if South Africa regulates the investment sector without 
isolating itself from the international investment community? The aims and objectives 
of the study are also dealt with in the first. The aims and objectives of the study also 
forms the basis of this study. 
 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of the study is to analyse the way in which national and international affect 
the FDI inflow and the economy of South Africa. In order to do this the study will follow 
in the below chronological order. 
The study will commence with the introduction to the protection of investment in South 
Africa. It will also look at the general historical overview that will deal with the FDI legal 
framework economy during the pre-1994 era in South Africa and the position of South 
Africa’s economy during this period. It will also look at the South African economy 
during the operation of BITs in the post-1994 era. The study will analyse certain 
provisions of two BITs, namely the China-SA BIT and the UK-SA BIT. The study will 
look at the China-SA BIT because China is one of the BRICS countries with high a 
GDP. The UK-SA BIT was chosen because it was the first BIT that South Africa 
concluded in the post-1994 era. 
The study will then look at the factors and challenges that led to the new approach to 
the regulation of investments in South Africa. This will ensure an understanding of the 
BITs, whether or not the BITs managed to fulfil the duties and obligations to protect 
and promote foreign investors in South Africa.  
The determinants of FDI at the national level will be discussed in detail. In this regard, 
the political stability, potential economic growth, the rule of law, openness and 
transparency, the size of the population, exchange rate considerations and openness 
to regional and international trade will be discussed. Then the protection of FDI in 
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accordance with international law will also be discussed. The study will critically 
analyse the protection of Protection of Investment Act. 
The study will look at different laws from different countries to establish whether there 
are other countries that did away with the BITs, or whether they allowed the BITs to 
operate alongside national laws and their consequences thereof. The study will look at 
the impact these laws had on the FDI in South Africa. 
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Most policy makers believe that the FDI contributes to the economy of a country. 
However, there need to be laws that regulate the FDI in order to combat failure of those 
investments laws. As stated above the termination of the BITs by South Africa raised 
global concerns with regard to the FDI because the international investment 
community may not regard South Africa as a friendly investment jurisdiction.  
There is a paucity of literature dealing with the new approach to regulating FDI in South 
Africa because this is a recent development. The Minister of the DTI is certain that the 
new investment legal framework will attract more investors to South Africa, while 
scholars and economists are sceptical about South Africa’s approach the new 
investments regulation. 
Carim,71 although accepting that the BITs signalled South Africa’s re-entry into the 
international community after years of isolation,72 argues that other countries have also 
embarked on the investment protection review.73 He argues that the first generation 
BITs concluded by South Africa are ambiguous and makes for unpredictable 
interpretation.74 He goes further to say that, they are inconsistent with the 
Constitution.75 Another critic of BITs opines that  
                                                          
71 Mr Xavier Carim is a deputy director general in the Department of International Trade and Economic 
Development. 
72 Carim X “International Investment Agreements and Africa’s structural transformation: A perspective 
from South Africa” http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPB4_IIAs-and-
Africa%E2%80%99s-Structural-Transformation-Perspective-from-South-Africa_EN.pdf (Date of use: 
26 November 2015). 
73 Id at 5-6. 
74Carim X ”Review of BITs” 
http://www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/dti_review_of_bits_ppc_20130215.pdf (Date of use: 
06 May 2015). 
75 Ibid. 
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“The system’s unique use of private arbitration conflicts with cherished principles of 
judicial accountability and independence in democratic societies and this taints the 
integrity of the legal system by contracting out of the judicial function in public law”.76 
 
Subedi77 argues that investors use the BITs to ensure that regulation of investments in 
host states is more transparent, stable, predictable and secure. Mossallam stipulated 
that the bureaucrats who negotiated of the first generation BITs were not lawyers and 
had little legal and technical expertise in international law.78 However, the first ever BIT 
that South Africa concluded with Paraguay in 1974 is still in force.79 Although the 
Protection of Investment Act deals with some of the difficulties in investment, it does 
not deal with most issues that will affect the future FDI in South Africa.  
Hills-Lewis80 argues that the Protection of Investment Bill, instead of offering more 
protection to foreign investors, it diminishes their protection.81 He further argues that 
the Investment Bill contradicts South Africa’s international commitments under the 
SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment‚ which stipulates that member states’ 
investment legislation should provide for greater protection than the protection that 
international law affords foreign investors.82  
Using the view of the minister of the Minister of the DTI, Carim, Hills-Lewis and the 
Piero Foresti case as a point of departure, the study will look at whether or not the new 
approach to the regulation of investments will indeed provide an incentive of foreign 
investments which will in turn influence the flow of the FDI in South Africa’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 Diehl A International Investment Law in Context (2008) 9. 
77 Subedi S P is a professor at the University of Leeds. 
78 Mossallam M “Process matters: South Africa’s experience exiting its BITs” (University of Oxford: 
The Global Economic Governance Programme 2015) 8. 
79 UNCTAD “Number of IIs per economy” 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 27 May 2015). 
80 Hill-Lewis G is a spokesperson for the Democratic Alliances (hereinafter referred to as the DA). 
81 RDM News Wire “ANC rams anti-Investment Bill through Committee‚ DA charges” 
http://m.polity.org.za/article/anc-rams-anti-investment-bill-through-committee-da-charges-2015-11-03 
(Date of Use: 04 November 2015). 
82 Ibid. 
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1.6 GENERAL MEANING AND DEFINITIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
FDI is an equity or ownership investment of more than 10 per cent by an investor in 
one country83 in an enterprise located in another country84 for financial gain.85 FDI is 
an investment made by a state or a private individual or a private entity in a foreign 
country for acquiring financial or economic advantage from the asset over a period of 
time.86 FDI is one of the vehicles that could influence the growth and development of 
the economy of a country.87 However, it may also negatively affect the economy of a 
country. 
  
This means that states must ensure that FDI is properly regulated in the best interests 
of the country and its foreign investors. For example, a foreign company will be 
reluctant to invest in a country that does not promote its interests. Therefore, the laws 
regulating FDI must be structured in such a way that they provide incentives for foreign 
investors.  
 
There are many factors that influence the behaviour of foreign investors towards a host 
country. Equally so is the competing interest of the host state. This requires a balancing 
of competing interests to create a mutually conducive foreign investment environment. 
For example, political stability,88 openness to regional and international trade,89 
competitiveness,90 local market and international/ global market access.91 
 
On the international level, the rules of FDI law provide more protection than domestic 
law to foreign investors. This is because of the principles of international trade law, 
such as the pacta sunt servanda principle92 and the autonomy principle that provide 
protection for foreign investors.93 The pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to the 
                                                          
83 Also known as the home state. 
84 Also known as the host state. 
85 Salacuse J W The Law of Investment Treaties (2010) 29. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Hunter R et al “Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa” 1998-1999 Denver Journal of international 
Law and Policy 337. 
88 CIDA’s Economic Growth Strategy “stimulating sustainable economic growth” 1 http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/EconomicGrowth/$file/Sustainable-Economic-Growth-e.pdf 
(Date of use: 04 April 2016). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Id at 5. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Booysen H The Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (2004) 506-507. 
93 Id at 207-210. 
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international agreement to honour agreements that they have concluded at an 
international level.94  
 
Moreover, in terms of the autonomy principle, the parties on the international plane 
have a wide discretion regarding many aspects affecting their agreement.95 For 
example, they have the discretion to choose the law that will be applicable to their 
agreements, the competent body that will solve disputes arising from such 
agreements, and how to treat such agreements in a case where one of the party’s laws 
changes, or where there is no stabilisation clause. This is also known as the principle 
of contractual autonomy on the choice of law.96 A stabilisation clause ensures that 
future changes to the law of one of the parties do not alter the terms of the agreement.97 
In other words, a stabilisation clause freezes the law that is applicable at the time of 
the conclusion of the agreement.98  
 
Historic events are essential in understanding the development of FDI that will suit the 
changing economic environment. This is because the modern FDI law is the product 
of a historical process that has developed over many years.99 Therefore, rules of 
international investment law must be developed in such a way that they are flexible 
enough to fit the changing economic environment.  
 
One of the instruments, which regulate international investment law, is the treaty. A 
treaty may be broadly divided into three categories, namely, contractual, legislative 
and Constitutional. A contractual treaty is drawn up between states and governs 
matters such as trade, extradition, air space, landing rights and mutual defence.100 In 
this instance, states contract with each other to establish a particular legal 
relationship.101 A legislative treaty is entered into by states and codifies existing rules 
of customary international law or which create new rules of law.102 However, this type 
                                                          
94 Id at 292-293. 
95 Id at 207-208. 
96 Woodward W J “The contractual choice of law: legislative choice in an era of party autonomy” 2001 
SMU Law Review 711. 
97 Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2004) 407. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Subedi S P The Law of Investment Treaties (2010) 79. 
100 Dugard J International Law: a South African perspective (2012) 25. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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of treaty, although it may be known as legislative or law-making, is only binding on 
member states.103 International organisations, like the United Nations104 are created 
by the by multilateral treaties such as the Charter of the United Nations which serves 
as a Constitution of the United Nations105. 
 
However, a treaty is founded on consent of the parties and binding only to its member 
states.106 In the S. S. Lotus (France v Turkey)107 the Permanent Court of International 
Justice108 emphasised consent as the basis of international law. The PCIJ held that 
the rules of law binding upon states emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law.109 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as follows:  
“an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed 
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation”.110 
 
Before the development of BITs, Bilateral Economic Treaties, such as the Treaties of 
Friendship, Treaties of Commerce and Treaties of Navigation, regulated foreign 
investments.111 A treaty is a written agreement between states or between states and 
international organisations, operating within the field of international law.112 The rules 
and procedure to be followed when entering into treaties, the interpretation of treaties 
and the termination of treaties are contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969113 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between states 
and International Organisations and between International Organisations of 1986.114 
 
                                                          
103 Ibid. 
104 United Nations (Hereinafter referred to as the UN). 
105 Dugard J International Law: a South African perspective (2012) 25. 
106 Ibid. 
107 The S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) PCIJ Series A, No.10 (1927) (hereinafter referred to as the Lotus 
(France v Turkey case).  
108 The Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter referred to as the PCIJ). 
109 The Lotus (France v Turkey case para 18. 
110 Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter referred to as the 
Vienna Convention). 
111 Id at 16. 
112 Dugard J International Law: a South African perspective (2012) 25. 
113 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the VC on the 
Law of treaties).  
114 Dugard J International Law: a South African perspective (2012) 25. 
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These treaties dealt with the granting of reciprocal commercial privileges between the 
parties and their nationals.115 They afforded individuals protection of their properties, 
freedom of movement and the right to trade and engage in commercial enterprise.116 
They also contained the Most Favoured Nation117 and the National Treatment 
principles.118 However, these treaty agreements were ambiguous and contained many 
uncertainties regarding investor protection and promotion.119  
 
As a result, FDI was not always well-balanced. Post-World War II, international 
investment law is flawed. Firstly, it contains scattered treaty provisions, contested 
customs and questionable general principles of law.120 Second, it fails to afford an 
investor the right to make a monetary transfer from the host state to another state.121  
 
Third, the principles that existed at that time were vague and subject to many different 
interpretations.122 Finally, it does provide a foreign investor with effective mechanisms 
to pursue a claim against the host state, where the host state had not fulfilled its 
contractual obligations, resulting in a grievance on the part of the foreign investor.123 
This meant that the host state could unilaterally change contracts, which could result 
in the expropriation of the property of the foreign investor or force him to renegotiate 
the agreement.124  
 
Furthermore, when European traders travelled to the African and Asian continents to 
do business, the law of the host state did not apply to them, as they were under the 
law of their home countries wherever they went.125 Therefore, when European traders 
immigrated to other countries, the domestic law of those countries did not apply to 
them.  
                                                          
115 Miles K The origins of international investment law: Empire, environment and the safeguarding of 
capital (2013) 24. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Most Favoured Nation Principle (hereinafter referred to as the MFN). 
118 Ibid. 
119 Salacuse J W “The treatification of international investment law” 2007 Law and Business Review of 
America 155. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid.                                                                            
123 Id at156. 
124 Salacuse J W The Law of Investment Treaties (2010) 78. 
125 Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2012) 7. 
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This meant that their assets could not be expropriated or nationalised through local 
legislation of the host state. The European countries concluded treaties with Asian and 
African countries that confirmed this position.126 In as much as this was generally an 
advantage, it also worked against the foreign investor, who could not benefit from the 
domestic laws of the host state. 
 
States realised that there was a need for treaties that would provide procedural and 
substantive protection and promotion of foreign investments.127 To overcome these 
problems, developed countries began a process of international investment treaties 
negotiations that would be complete, clear, specific and enforceable.128 The 
negotiations of BITs started more than five decades ago when the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Pakistan signed the first BIT in 1959.129  
 
The Germany-Pakistan BIT130 dealt with the scope of protection by defining protected 
investments, and provided state-to-state dispute resolution before the ICJ,131 or the 
arbitration tribunal.132 These two provisions can still be found in modern BITs. 
However, the Germany-Pakistan BIT did not provide for a dispute resolution 
mechanism between the foreign investor and the host state.133 The Chad-Italy BIT first 
introduced dispute resolution between an investor and a host state in 1969.134 
 
In 1960, European countries led, by Germany negotiated BITs that dealt exclusively 
with FDIs, and that were aimed at creating a basic legal framework that will govern 
investments by nationals of one country in the territory of another country.135 Shortly 
afterwards Switzerland, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
                                                          
126 Id at 8. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Schefer K N International Investment Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (2013) 1. 
130 The Germany-Pakistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the Germany-
Pakistan BIT http://investmentpo25licyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/78/treaty/1732 (Date of use: 11 
November 2015). This BIT has been replaced by the 2009 BIT. 
131 The ICJ is the main judicial organ of the UN. The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with 
international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 
(Date of use: 11 November 2015). 
132 Mestral A and Lӗvesque C (eds) Improving International Investment Agreements (2013) 16. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Mestral A and Lӗvesque C (eds) Improving International Investment Agreements (2013) 16. 
135 Ibid. 
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Belgium, also entered into what became known as the “first generation” BITs with 
specific developing countries.136  
 
The purpose of these BITs was to ensure that host countries are subject to international 
legal rules, and that foreign investors could lodge a claim in international arbitration 
against a host country that violated obligations contained in the BITs.137 These treaties 
resulted in the fact that host states could no longer invoke national laws to avoid their 
international obligations arising from the notion of international minimum standards.138  
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study is not empirical. Legislation, case law and international instruments serve 
as primary sources, while journal articles, academic writing and electronic resources 
are my secondary sources. Qualitative research is the focus of this dissertation. 
1.8 BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTERS 
The study consists of five chapters and is broken down as follows. 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 is an historic overview of the regulation of foreign investment in South Africa. 
It looks at the regulation of FDI before the development of BITs and at the South African 
economy during that period. This chapter further discusses the UK-SA BIT and the 
Piero Foresti case. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the protection of foreign investments in accordance with the South 
African law. It mainly focuses on domestic factors that may influence the FDI inflow.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with the protection of FDI on the international level. It looks at different 
principles of international minimum standards of treatment. The following principles are 
discussed: the Most Favoured Nation, the National Treatment, the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, and Full Protection and Security. 
 
                                                          
136 The International Institute for Sustainable Development “Investment Treaties and the Search for 
Market Access in China” https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/06/26/investment-treaties-and-the-search-for-
market-access-in-china/ (Date of Use: 16 May 2016).  
137 Salacuse J W The Treatification of International Investment law (2007) 156. 
138 Subedi S P “International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2012) 8. 
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Chapter 5 focuses inter alia on the impact that national laws such as the Protection of 
Investment Act and the Expropriation Bill139 have on the economy of South Africa. It 
also looks at how international investment law affects the economy of South Africa.  
 
Chapter 6 contains the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
139 The Expropriation Bill, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the Expropriation Bill). 
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CHAPTER 2: THE OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although most scholars concentrate on the development of South African FDI during 
the 20th century, the development of FDI dates back many centuries.140 The modern 
FDI is the product of a historical process that has passed through different phases. 
This chapter looks at the legal historic development of FDI in South Africa during the 
pre- and post-democracy periods. 
  
2.2 THE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA DURING THE PRE-DEMOCRATIC ERA  
Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s former Minister of Finance, emphasised the importance 
of historical events that still influence the South African economy today. In a 
presentation in March 2007, he said:  
 
“We can never fully escape the myriad of economic events, decisions, and systems 
that inform our history. They determine the structure of the economy that we have 
addressed over the past 12 years and with which we grapple today”.141 
  
He continued: 
“We must use ideas generated here and abroad to develop new paths that reach 
organically from our past into a future that is determined and shaped by our new 
democracy. So while the new must come from the old, the direction they take into our 
common future can and must be consciously influenced by us”.142 
 
During the pre-democratic era, South Africa was generally isolated from, and rejected 
by the international community, because of its apartheid legislation143 South Africa had 
no international investment agreements with other states.144 Most of its investments 
came from government expenditure on infrastructure, (roads, dams, railways, 
                                                          
140 Schefer K N International Investment Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (2013) 3. 
141 Manuel T A “Economic policy and South Africa’s growth strategy” 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/speeches/2007/2007031901.pdf (Date of use: 13 August 
2015). 
142 Ibid. 
143 South African History Online “South African history online”http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-
africas-foreign-relations-during-apartheid-1948 (Date of use: 18 April 2016). 
144 Ibid. 
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electronics, weaponries and agriculture).145 It is important to look at how South Africa 
functioned during the pre-democratic era in order to understand the modern legal 
framework for FDI in South Africa today.  
 
South Africa enacted legislation, regulations and policies that were aimed at regulating 
investments. The Bantu Investment Corporation Act146 was enacted in 1951. The 
government established corporations to promote and encourage investments in the 
development of Bantu people in Bantu areas by encouraging existing Bantu 
undertakings, the promotion of new ones, the provision of capital, and by giving 
technical assistance and export advice.147 
 
In 1959, the ANC called for sanctions against the country, which fundamentally 
affected its economy. At the time, South African economy relied heavily on foreign 
capital, and was potentially vulnerable. The UN General Assembly passed its 1962 
resolution, calling for a ban on exports to or imports from South Africa by three 
countries, namely, Britain, the United States of America and Japan.148  
 
Apart from the ANC and other opposition groups, the UN was also an outspoken 
opponent of South Africa's system of institutionalised racial segregation.149 From 1964 
until 1993, the UN led an international campaign encouraging states to take collective 
action against South Africa. Since the UN Security Council and General Assembly 
have repeatedly declared apartheid incompatible with international law and the UN 
Charter.150 During the 1950s, the General Assembly made numerous appeals to South 
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Africa to abolish its policy, declaring it a crime against humanity.151 The South African 
government responded by stating that apartheid was an internal affairs matter and fell 
beyond the scope of the UN.152 The result was economic sanctions, bringing about the 
isolation of South Africa from the international community.153 In 1962, the UN 
requested member states to break diplomatic, trade and transport relations in an 
attempt to force South Africa to abolish apartheid.154 The United Nations General 
Assembly declared the year 1982 the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions 
against South Africa.155 
 
Despite sanctions, South Africa continued to be regarded as a favourable investment 
destination and still attracted billions of dollars in foreign investments.156 This was the 
result of apartheid policies that ensured investors cheap labour, rapid expansion and 
high returns. Between 1956 and 1969, foreign investment in South Africa rose from R2 
790 million to R4 990 million.157 The average returns during those years increased from 
9 to 16 per cent.158 Then, around 1980, the apartheid policy was scrutinised yet again, 
resulting in foreign companies disinvesting their assets, citing inflation and recession 
as a reason.159  
 
In 1986, the USA, influenced by the UN Security Council, passed the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act,160 restricting its nationals from entering into new business deals in 
South Africa.161 The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter of the United 
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Nations162 to institute economic sanctions against any state that poses a threat to 
international peace.163  
 
This led to 214 out of 324 US companies withdrawing their businesses from South 
Africa.164 The UN Security Council further called on members to introduce more far-
reaching economic measures against the country, but a draft resolution of selective 
sanctions was vetoed by the UK and the USA in 1988.165 
 
 By 1989, South Africa’s economy had suffered immensely as a result of 
disinvestments and international capital boycotts,166 which put pressure on the 
government to end its apartheid policies in order to regain the friendly investment 
environment it had enjoyed in the 1950s. South Africa had to adapt its laws and 
investment regulations in order not to be completely isolated from the global economy. 
 
During the pre-democratic era, South Africa’s FDI was affected by complex foreign 
exchange control policies such as the South African Exchange Control Regulation.167 
The SAECR was controlling South Africa’s currency reserves and its purpose was to 
mobilise and centralise the supervision of the country’s gold and foreign exchange 
resources, ensuring that these were utilised for the benefit of the country and to 
regulate payment of imports and loans. Furthermore, the South African government 
implemented strict foreign exchange controls to regulate the flow of funds in and out 
of the country.168 
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2.3 THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES ERA IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.3.1 The Conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaty 
The global governance system for FDI is made up of a complex network of international 
investment agreements that are usually concluded on a bilateral basis.169 Since the 
beginning of the democratic era in 1994, South Africa has attempted to monopolise 
FDI through domestic laws, international investment agreements and policies.170 The 
country underwent a drastic transformation by abolishing the socio-economic, political 
and legal structure of the apartheid regime.  
 
Post-democracy South Africa reviewed some of its laws, policies and regulations with 
a purpose of re-entering the international community. For example, it began to 
conclude BITs aimed at protecting and promoting FDI in South Africa. BITs can be 
described as hard law as they delegate the authority of interpretation and 
implementation to trans-national arbitration bodies.171 They notably grant foreign 
investors direct legal personality under international law.172 
 
As a result, South Africa became an investor-friendly jurisdiction for foreign 
investments, thereby improving the economy. South Africa offered several advantages 
for investing in the country, some of which being an unrivalled transport and 
telecommunication infrastructure, rich mineral resources, and a diverse manufacturing 
industry. 
 
At present, out of the 40 BITs that were concluded in the past, only 17 are still in 
force.173 On the other hand, China, a developing country and a BRICS member country 
with a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has more than 108 BITs in place.174 
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The Constitution makes provision for the conclusion of international agreements. In 
terms of section 231(1) of the Constitution,175 the national executive is responsible for 
negotiating and concluding international agreements. However, both the National 
Assembly176 and the National Council of Provinces must approve them,177 unless they 
fall within the scope of the exception in section 231(3) of the Constitution.178  
 
The National Executive has delegated the power to negotiate and conclude 
international trade agreements with the DTI and the Department of International Trade 
and Economic Development.179 On the other hand, the DTI has been delegated the 
responsibility to formulate and implement international agreements. Together, these 
two government departments play an important role with regard to the economic 
development in South Africa. 
 
Although the BIT regime was already in 1959 amongst international investments 
communities, South Africa only signed its first BIT in 1994.180 Since then, the country 
has entered into many different BITs, the first being with Germany, Switzerland and 
the Netherlands. 
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In the past, BITs were generally concluded between developed and developing 
states.181 However, today BITs can be concluded between developed as well as 
developing countries. By the end of 2015, more than 3 000 BITs were concluded 
between various countries using a pre-determined treaty template,182 containing the 
guidelines, and the number is still increasing.183  
 
Entering into BITs offer many advantages for the host state, foreign investment may 
bring the advancement of employment, resources, technologies, telecommunication, 
transport networks, energy production systems and skills. A further advantage is that 
they may create a nexus between international markets and the host state.  
 
Statistics show that from 2002 and 2008, South Africa’s economy grew at an average 
of 4.5 per cent year-on-year, which has been the largest economic growth since the 
establishment of democracy in 1994.184 
 
However, as a result of factors such as the widening gap between rich and poor, a low-
skilled labour force and a high unemployment rate, deteriorating infrastructure, 
automotive strikes, high corruption, high crime rates and a change in the regulation of 
FDI, the country’s economic growth has been slow, and below the African average in 
2014 and 2015.185 South Africa’s economy grew by 1.5 per cent in 2014.186 In 2015, 
South Africa experienced severe drought conditions that had a considerable impact on 
the economy.187 This led to a decrease of 0.2 per cent of the country’s GDP landing it 
on 1.3 per cent in 2015.188 In the first quarter of 2016, South Africa’s economy further 
declined by 1.2 per cent.189  
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The South African government, the DTI and the Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation, after a three-year investment policy review process, took a decision 
to terminate the BITs with foreign states and introduced the Promotion and Protection 
of Investment Bill190 in November 2013191 and promulgated the Protection of 
Investment Act 22 of 2015.192 The BITs with most European countries have already 
been terminated. A present, South Africa has only three BITs with SADC member 
states in place out of 15. However, the BITs with three BRICS member countries, 
Russia, India and China are still in force.193 
 
One reason for terminating these BITs is that the Protection of Investment Act updates 
and modernises South Africa’s legal framework for foreign investments,194 while 
increasing the protection and promotion of both domestic and international 
investments. Another is that they were close to their termination dates and would 
otherwise have been automatically extended in terms of their renewal clauses.  
 
For example, the South Africa-Germany BIT195 contains a twelve-month notice period 
with a run-off protection for existing protected investments of twenty years,196 while the 
SA-Netherlands BIT197 contains a six-month notice period with a ten-year automatic 
renewal period and a fifteen-year run-off period for investments made before the 
termination date.198 The South Africa-United Kingdom BIT199 contains a twelve month 
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application period after the notice of termination and a twenty-year run-off protection 
period for existing investments.200  
 
According to the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Protection of Investment Act will 
provide “adequate protection to all investors, including foreign investors”, and it will 
ensure that “South Africa’s constitutional obligations, like sustainable development,201 
are upheld, while allowing government to retain the policy space to regulate in the 
public interest”.202 He further argues that there is no connection between the growth of 
South Africa’s economy and the BITs,203 although some of these countries are South 
Africa’s largest trading partners.204 
 
Although the BITs come with numerous benefits, they also create obligations for the 
host state. Therefore, the provisions of the BITs are important in this regard. Most BITs 
contain five core state obligations, namely, fair and equitable treatment; security and 
protection; national treatment; most favoured nation; and/or expropriation.205  
 
2.4 THE DISCUSSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM-SOUTH AFRICA BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY 
The UK-SA BIT206 was the first BIT that South Africa concluded in the post-democracy 
era with another country and it was used as a template for the BIT’s subsequently 
concluded. It is, therefore, important to discuss briefly the provisions of the UK-SA BIT, 
in order to provide a background as to why South Africa decided to embark on the 
investment policy review process, and the consequences that such a review might 
have for the country’s economy. However, not all the provisions of the UK-SA BIT will 
be discussed, but only those common to all the BITs between South Africa and other 
countries. 
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2.4.1 Article 1: Definitions 
The definition of investment may vary from one BIT to another. The definition 
determines the subject matter of the agreement,207 and it may influence the flow of the 
FDI. Although each BIT is structured differently, most BITs contain common provisions, 
as states normally use templates when negotiating and drafting the BITs. 
  
Article 1 of the UK-SA BIT defines the meaning and scope of transactions that can be 
regarded as investment. In terms of article 1(a), investments include movable and 
immovable assets; shares and stock of a company; claims of money or any 
performance in terms of a contract that has a financial value; intellectual property 
rights, goodwill, technical processes and skills; and business concessions conferred 
by law or under contract, including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or 
exploit natural resources. 
 
2.4.2 Article 2: The promotion and protection of investment 
Article 2 deals with the promotion and protection of investment. It requires both 
contracting states to the BIT to encourage and create favourable conditions for 
nationals or companies of both contracting states to invest capital, and for the 
admission of investments in their respective territories.208 The contracting states are 
required to accord fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors who are nationals 
of the contracting states.209 
 
2.4.3 Article 3: National Treatment and Most Favoured-Nation Treatment 
This part of the UK-SA BIT sets out the treatment of foreign investment under article 
3. Article 3 prohibits discrimination of foreign investors by the host state. Both 
contracting states are required to treat foreign investors as though they were nationals 
of the host state. The host state is also required to accord investors of the contracting 
state the same treatment that it accords its own investors and foreign investors of a 
third party.210 
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This is a provision under which FDI law accords aggrieved investors the right to sue 
host states for any new legislation or government action that alters, in an unreasonable 
or discriminatory manner, the conditions under which their investments have been 
made. 
 
2.4.4 Article 4: Compensation for loses 
The article stipulates as to how foreign investors are to be compensated in case of 
loss. In terms of this provision, a foreign investor may be compensated for losses that 
ensued as a result of war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national 
emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of the host state.211 The aggrieved 
foreign investor can claim either restitution or indemnification. Furthermore, 
compensation for loss must be effected without prejudice.212 Therefore, in terms of this 
provision, market value is taken into account, and investors are unlikely to receive less 
compensation than they are entitled to. 
 
2.4.5 Article 5: Expropriation 
Expropriation often forms a core provision of the BITs, especially since the protection 
against expropriation was the main reason for concluding the first generation BITs.213 
This is one of the provisions that act as a blanket for foreign investors. It protects 
foreign investment from expropriation by the host state. Under FDI law, the aggrieved 
foreign investors may claim compensation for the expropriation of their investments. 
Article 5 requires the host state to refrain from nationalising or expropriating assets of 
the foreign investors in their respective countries, unless the expropriation is for a 
public purpose.214  
 
Where expropriation is necessary, the host state must ensure that the compensation 
is prompt, adequate and effective.215 This precludes the host state from discounting 
the value of the investment by reference to the purpose of the expropriation. It is 
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unusual for a state to openly expropriate property belonging foreign investors. For this 
reason, the most common forms of expropriation is indirect expropriation.216 
 
2.4.6. Article 6: Repatriation of investment and returns 
This provision allows for flexible investments. Article 6 guarantees foreign investors 
the unrestricted transfer of and returns on their investments. It requires the host state 
to transfer investments without delays, and to use the convertible currency in which 
the capital was originally invested, or any other convertible currency agreed to by the 
investor and the host state concerned.217  
 
2.4.7 Article 8: Settlement of dispute between an investor and a host state 
The UK-SA BIT makes provision for the settlement of investment disputes. It 
distinguishes between the state-investor dispute resolution and the dispute between 
the contracting states. However, only the investor-state dispute resolution will be 
discussed here. In terms of this provision, foreign investors have a right to initiate 
lawsuits directly against host states.218 For example, the aggrieved foreign investor 
who has a dispute with the South African government relating to foreign investments 
within South Africa, has recourse to any international arbitration or other neutral forum 
to resolve the dispute.219 
 
The aggrieved foreign investor is afforded different channels via which to submit a 
claim against the host state. For example, the aggrieved foreign investor may submit 
a claim either to international arbitration, ICSID, the Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce,220 or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal. In the past 
two decades, foreign investors have approached investment arbitral tribunals to 
challenge state regulations that were interfering with their rights.221  
 
Although the UK-SA BIT has many flaws, South Africa used it a guideline when 
concluding subsequent BITs. This means that South Africa incorporated the flaws in 
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the UK-SA BIT. For this reason, Africa attempted to remedy this problem by reviewing 
its foreign investment legal framework. 
 
2.5 THE DISCUSSION OF THE PIERO FORESTI CASE 
2.5.1 The facts of the case  
The Piero Foresti222 case dealt with the mining interests owned by a group of European 
investors namely, Piero Foresti, and Laura de Carli who had investments in South 
Africa. The South African government was the respondent in this arbitration. The 
proceedings were initiated by the Italian investors who were claimants, under Article 8 
of the Italy-SA BIT223 and Article 10 of the Luxembourg-SA BIT, respectively.224 The 
claimants submitted their claims to arbitration, in accordance with the rules of the 
facility of the ICSID. 
 
Taking cognisance of the fact that the Italian investors held some of their assets 
indirectly through a Luxembourg incorporated company, they lodged parallel claims 
under the Luxembourg-SA BIT, the reason being that the provisions of the 
Luxembourg-SA BIT are identical in substance to those of the Italy‐SA BIT. As a result, 
it was convenient for the matters to be heard concurrently.  
 
2.5.2 The issue before the court  
The court had to decide whether the coming into operation of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resource Development Act225 resulted in a direct and/or indirect 
expropriation of the assets of the claimants. 
 
2.5.3 The claimants’ claims and arguments 
The claimants alleged that South Africa was in breach of Articles 5 of both BITs. Firstly, 
they alleged that the coming into effect of the MPRDA extinguished certain putative old 
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order mining rights226 held by the claimants. Therefore, the MPRDA brought an end to 
the old order mineral law by repealing the common law as its principles are in conflict 
with the MPRDA.227  
 
Secondly, that the coming into effect of the MPRDA, when combined with the Mining 
Charter,228 the South African Chamber of Mines, the National Union of Mineworkers,229 
and the South African Mineral Development Association230 is an attempt to encourage 
greater ownership of mining industry assets by historically disadvantaged South 
Africans.231 In this regard they challenged the international legality of the Broad-based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act.232. 
 
Lastly, they alleged that the old order mining rights associated with fifty properties 
affecting twenty-five quarries have been directly expropriated against a measure of 
compensation that is still pending. They further alleged that even if the amount of 
compensation had been determined, it would still not satisfy the standards for 
compensation required under both the Italy-SA BIT and the Luxembourg-SA BIT.233  
 
With regard to these allegations, the claimants made the following arguments: firstly, 
that the MPRDA and the Mining Charter breached the respondent’s Fair and Equitable 
Treatment and National Treatment obligations under the Italy-SA and Luxembourg-SA 
BITs.234 Secondly, that the two BITs by virtue of the Most Favoured Nations clauses 
provided them with protection from direct and indirect expropriation, measures having 
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an effect equivalent to expropriation and measures limiting permanently or temporarily 
investors’ rights of ownership, possession, control or enjoyment of the investments.235 
 
The claimants argued that their rights have been expropriated in the following two 
ways. First, that the old order mining rights associated with forty-four properties 
affecting twenty-one quarries have been effectively, definitively and directly or 
indirectly expropriated because, at the end of the conversion process, no new order 
right has been granted and therefore, no compensation has been granted.236 Second, 
that the old order mining rights associated with five properties affecting four quarries 
have been directly expropriated against a measure of compensation that fails to satisfy 
the standards for compensation required under both BITs.237  
 
They further argued that if these cases did not amount to direct expropriations, then 
they were indirect and/or partial expropriations and/or inequivalent measures taken 
against inadequate compensation.238  
 
In support of their arguments, the claimants relied on Articles 5(1) and 5(2) in both 
BITs.239 For an expropriation to be valid, it, 
(i) must be “for public purposes or in the national interest” or “for a public purpose 
related to the internal needs of the country”;  
(ii) must be on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(iii) the compensation must be prompt, adequate and effective; and 
(iv) must be undertaken “under due process of law”.240 
 
2.5.4 The respondent’s arguments  
With regard to the claimants’ allegations in the memorial, the respondent argued that 
assuming, for argument’s sake that the claimants have a valid claim for expropriation 
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of the old order mineral rights, the expropriation was lawful under both BITs and 
therefore, the respondent did not breach the BITs as alleged by the claimants.241  
 
They gave the following reason for this argument: that the two BITs permit South Africa 
to expropriate investments provided that the expropriation meets the requirements for 
expropriation contained in both BITs.242 They further argued that the alleged 
expropriation of old order mineral rights were undertaken for multiple and important 
public purposes, and that the claimants had conceded as much in their memorial.243 
 
The respondent pointed out that that the MRPDA and the Mining Charter were 
promulgated for the purpose of: 
(i) “simplifying and modernizing an overly complex legal system;  
(ii) ameliorating the disenfranchisement of historical disadvantaged South Africans and 
from the Mineral Act;244  
 (iii) reducing the economically harmful concentration of mineral rights and promoting 
the optimal exploitation of mineral resources; and  
(iv) protecting the environment and the communities living close to mining 
operations”.245 
 
The respondent further argued that, with respect to compensation, the obligation to 
provide immediate or prompt compensation is met where: first, the state provides the 
investor without undue delay, with access to an effective mechanism for the 
determination whether compensation is due, and if so, the amount required. Second, 
should the mechanism determine that compensation is due, it is paid within a short 
time after the amount has been fixed with interest, taking to account the value of money 
at that time?246 
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The respondent further argued that the Mining Charter’s divestment requirements 
treated all investors, whether South African or foreign, equally.247 Moreover, the 
respondent argued that even if the Mining Charter were found to treat foreign investors 
differently from South African investors, the difference in treatment would fall well 
within the requirement of advancing critical public interests.248 
 
The respondent argued further that there was no direct expropriation of the old order 
mineral rights. The respondent pointed out that direct expropriation requires the 
complete deprivation of all rights enjoyed by the investor along with transfer of 
ownership.249 In this regard, it was argued that neither complete deprivation nor 
transfer of ownership can be shown in this case because the operating companies 
have retained the same core entitlement to prospect or mine granite on an exclusive 
basis under a different name.250 
 
As regards indirect expropriation, the respondent argued that there was no indirect 
expropriation for three reasons. Firstly, a non-discriminatory regulation such as the one 
in issue before the tribunal cannot be expropriation without a prior promise that the 
regulation would not be adopted in future.251 Second, that there can be no indirect 
expropriation unless the investor has been substantially deprived of his/her rights in 
the investment.252 Lastly, there can be no indirect expropriation where the government 
action in question is a rational and proportional means of pursuing legitimate public 
regulatory purposes.253 
 
2.5.5 The decision of the court  
The case was not finalised as anticipated, because on 2 November 2009, the claimants 
sought the respondent’s consent to discontinue the proceedings in accordance with 
Article 50 of the Additional Facility Rules.254 The claimants argued that, although they 
had not been provided with full relief for their alleged injuries, they nevertheless sought 
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discontinuance, because on 12 December 2008, the respondent granted the claimants 
new order mineral rights without requiring the claimants to sell 26 per cent of their 
shares to historically disadvantaged South Africans.255 
 
The parties agreed that the operating companies would be deemed to have complied 
with the Mining Charter by declaring 21 per cent of the stone mined a beneficiation 
offset in South Africa, and providing a 5 per cent employee ownership programme for 
employees of the claimants.256 The claimants informed the respondent and the tribunal 
that they were willing to agree to discontinuance with an award dismissing their claims 
with res judicata effect.257 The discontinuance of the case was granted. 
 
2.5.6 The critical analysis of the Piero Foresti case 
Conflicts may arise as to the rights of foreign investors and the rights of the host state. 
For example, economic conditions may change within states and alter both the 
feasibility and the content of existing laws and policies. Generally, investment 
agreements are premised on a reciprocal relationship between the foreign investor and 
the host state. The foreign investors establish investments that create more favourable 
economic conditions in the host state, while the host state protects the investments 
within its territory.258  
 
Aligning the rights of investors and those of the host state has been a long-standing 
practice and can be complicated. How does one balance the scale between the rights 
of the host state and those of the foreign investor? One may argue that the host state 
is entitled to protect its citizenry like in the Piero Foresti case. However, when a 
developing country such as South Africa relies heavily on FDI for economic 
development, the rights of foreign investors may not be ignored. 
 
It must be remembered that, at times, these two interests may be in conflict with one 
another. This is because states allow foreign investments to improve economic 
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development in the host state, while foreign investors invest in another country to 
enhance their own competitiveness and market share.259 This may lead to investment 
disputes between the host state and the foreign investors as seen in the Piero Foresti 
case. 
 
Although the claimants did not succeed, the case prompted South Africa to embark on 
an investment policy review process in 2010. The policy review process was an attempt 
to identify loopholes in the BITs that South Africa had concluded, and to decide whether 
to continue with BITs as instruments to regulate FDI. South Africa felt that the scope 
of the first generation BITs is too wide, and may lead to many foreign investment 
disputes in future. South Africa realised a need to limit the scope of international law 
on foreign investments, while at the same time promoting foreign investments in South 
Africa.  
 
The Piero Foresti case was the first case to confront the regulation of FDI in South 
Africa in the post-1994 era in a direct manner. As much as this is a new development 
in the regulation of FDI in South Africa, it also raises the question as to whether the 
termination of the first-generation BITs is an adequate solution. Understandably, there 
may indeed be a need to review foreign investments policies. However, the outcome 
of the review is what concerns foreign investors. Did South Africa look at other options 
to remedy the concerns with regard to the first generation BITs?  
 
The purpose of affirmative action policies in South Africa is to achieve equality and to 
rectify the inequalities and injustices created by the apartheid government before 1994. 
South Africa generally has an obligation to advance the interests of its nationals, while 
promoting foreign investment in order to fulfil constitutional obligations for securing 
sustainable economic development. A balance needs to be created between the 
interests of the nationals of a host state and the interest of the foreign investors.  
 
On the other hand, foreign investors have a right to protection of their investment by 
the host state. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties require 
states to take into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
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relations between the parties”. Therefore, when solving FDI disputes the tribunal 
should have regard to international investment law and the rules of international law 
that are closely connected to the investments.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The importance of the historic overview of FDI in South Africa has been discussed. 
Certain provisions of the UK-SA BIT have also been highlighted in order to provide the 
background of the new approach to the regulation of foreign investment. The Piero 
Foresti case has prompted the South African government to scrutinise its first 
generation BIT regime.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
INFLOW IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is now generally recognised that both government institutions and the law play an 
important role in increasing economic growth. The South African economy had been 
growing strongly in the ten years since 2002. However, it has deteriorated since 2015. 
This prompts the question: what has gone wrong and how can this be fixed? South 
Africa needs to look back in order to find a way forward. 
 
The list of factors that affect FDI inflows is not exhaustive. There are many different 
factors that play a role in the flow of FDI. These factors cannot be isolated from each 
other because they collectively affect the FDI inflow, which also depends on the type 
of industry. For example, the manufacturing industry FDI and low wages play an 
important role, because it is a labour intensive industry in nature. These factors affect 
all three main economic sectors, namely, the extraction, manufacturing and service 
sectors.  
 
In the preceding chapters, the legal and policy regulatory environment and the FDI 
protection as determinants of FDI inflow have been discussed. Furthermore, some of 
the factors that influence the FDI inflow have already been discussed in the preceding 
chapters and will therefore, not be covered in this chapter. Instead, the following factors 
will be discussed here: the country’s governance and political stability; constitutional 
right to property; potential economic growth; the rule of law; exchange rate 
considerations; openness and transparency of the government; and the size of the 
population. 
 
3.2 COUNTRY GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL STABILITY 
The political stability of a country is of major importance because its governance style 
may have an impact on its perceived stability.260 Factors such as the frequency of 
changes in government, political tolerance, good governance, corruption levels, 
transparent regulatory frameworks, and public institutions all play an important role in 
determining FDI inflow.261  
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Based on the study by Luiz and Charalambous, this factor was rated between 4 and 
5, with 1 being less important and 5 being extremely important.262 Furthermore, this 
factor affects all aspects of a country, especially its economy, and it provides for 
conditions that allow growth and development of both local and international 
markets.263 Without a stable political environment, it is difficult to predict or rely on a 
sustainable long-term growth prospect, which FDIs critically depend on.264 
 
The lack of leadership on issues such as the appointment of political officials in both 
developed and emerging economies affecting structural reform will undermine 
prospects for growth and new opportunities for investors, which may negatively affect 
the FDI inflow.265 
 
In 2015, Mathews Phosa, in his presentation at the Austrian Business Chamber AGM, 
admitted that South Africa lacks political stability.266 He named four areas where this 
was lacking namely: 
a) inconsistencies in land reform and land ownership laws; 
b) the BEE policies that are often challenged and inconsistent create a wrong 
impression to the investment community; 
c) the mining policies are costing the industry dearly, with investment now going 
elsewhere in Africa, such as Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, among others; 
and  
d) agricultural development policy, coupled with land reform, not having been 
settled since 1994 is leading to reduced output.267  
 
He further stated that this needed to change, as a general lack of policy stability leads 
to political, social and economic uncertainty.268 In contrast, policy stability creates an 
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“investment friendly jurisdiction where every investor feels protected and free to do 
business”.269 In his argument, he stated that “past empowerment activities focused on 
dividing the economic cake rather than implementing actions and activities to grow the 
economic cake.”270  
 
An example of political unpredictability is the reshuffling of the cabinet by the President 
of South Africa on the 31st of March 2017, when twenty persons were affected by this 
adjustment.271 One of the cabinet members who was replaced, is the former Finance 
Minister, Pravin Gordhan, who272 was appointed in December 2015.273 He replaced 
Des van Rooyen who was appointed for a few days only.274 Gordon held office for just 
over a year. South Africa has made it to the top ten on the list of global risks to political 
stability for 2017.275 However, Spies276 does not agree with the list. She argues that 
there are not sufficient facts contained in the list, and that, when one regards it in a 
global context, it is unlikely that South Africa should be so high on the list.277 
 
The President, in his speech at the ANC rally in KZN278 blamed white persons for the 
country’s political instability and he alleged to be a victim in an international conspiracy 
to destabilise the country.279 In this regard, he stated that all the country’s money is 
still in white hands, and that those who were fighting against his reforms were, in fact, 
on the payrolls of these masters.280 He went on to state that he had to reappoint Mr 
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Gordhan281 because, “those with money would burn the country down”, if they did not 
have their way.282 
 
These decisions and statements are worrisome to the investment community and they 
are an example of the lack of political stability in South Africa. Most of the ministers 
hardly serve their full term in offices, a fact that has always had a significant impact on 
the value of the. For example, after the cabinet reshuffle, the currency weakened by 8 
per cent against the dollar.283 A few hours after the cabinet reshuffle, the value of the 
rand decreased from R12.79/$ on 30 March 2017 to R13.47/$ against the dollar by 
Friday morning at 6:30am.284 This was its biggest weekly drop since 2015 when the 
then Finance Minister Van Rooyen was dismissed.285  
 
3.3 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
The right to property is one of the important factors that influence the FDI inflow. The 
right to property is provided for in section 25 of the Constitution. Section 25(1) of the 
Constitution provides that “no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law 
of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. This 
provision protects the right to control assets. However, the acquisition of property is 
not provided for directly by section 25 the Constitution. Was it an error of the 
constitutional drafters not to provide for it directly, or was this done intentionally? The 
formulation of the right to property does not expressly refer to the acquisition of 
property.286 In the pre-1994 era, the acquisition of property was severely restricted for 
the majority of South Africans.287 It is difficult to assume that the constitutional drafters 
did not intend to include the constitutional right to property acquisition and protection. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the right to constitutional acquisition of property is 
implied by the Constitution since it is not provided for expressly. 
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The right to property includes the right to ownership, to use, to the exclusion of s from 
using it, to derive income from it, and to transfer and dispose of the property.288 The 
right to reparation of the property is provided for in section 11 of the Protection of 
Investment Act, which provides that a foreign investor may, in respect of the 
investment, repatriate funds subject to taxation and other applicable legislation. The 
repatriation in this context includes the owner’s property and is one of the main 
provisions in BITs. However, in the Investment Bill, the repatriation of property was not 
included, which was a great cause for concern on the part of foreign investors. The 
right to be able to move property at will is important.  
 
The government realised this error and included the right to repatriation of property in 
the subsequent Protection of Investment Act. The right to property is provided for in 
section 10 of the Protection of Investment Act, in terms of which it provides that 
investors have a constitutional right to property. Section 10 allows foreign investors to 
owner property within the Republic.  
 
It is important to determine whether the person or institution whose right to property 
has allegedly been infringed, is indeed protected by the Constitution. Woolman and 
Bishop argue that there are theoretically six approaches in the constitutional property 
clause to be taken in order to determine how the competing interests between the 
public and the individual’s property can be resolved.289 Firstly, the definition of property 
in terms of the Constitution will assist in determining the interest to be protected.290 If 
the interest in question is not of a type that can be protected by the Constitution, then 
it will not receive protection.291 In this instance, the interest protected will be the public 
interest.  
 
Second, the public interest as opposed to the individual right to property can be 
resolved by the court’s approach to the concept of deprivation.292 In order to deal with 
this enquiry, Woolman and Bishop differentiate between a strict approach and a 
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generous approach.293 A strict approach would exclude an ambit of constitutional 
concern types of regulations and thereby resolve the issue in favour of the public 
interest.294 A generous approach tends to include a broader range of types of 
regulation and thereby resolves the issue in favour of the individual interest.295 
 
Third, these competing interests can be resolved by using the application of the test of 
arbitrary deprivation in section 25 (1) of the Constitution.296 Fourth, the distinction 
between sections 25(1) (the deprivation clause), and 25(2) (the expropriation clause) 
of the Constitution plays an important role in this enquiry. The deprivation of property 
must occur in terms of the law of general application and arbitrary deprivation of 
property if not permitted.297 The expropriation of property is permitted only if it is for a 
public purpose and if just and equitable compensation is paid.298 Therefore, if these 
requirements are not met, the issue will be resolved in favour of private interest. 
 
Fifth, the competing interest may be resolved once the court has decided that 
deprivation or expropriation has taken place and then enquire as to the amount, the 
time and the manner of compensation.299 If, for example, the amount is not just and 
fair, or the compensation was made after an unreasonable time has passed, the issue 
will be resolved in favour of the private interest. Lastly, the limitation clause applies to 
all rights in the Bill of Rights; therefore, the competing interest can be resolved by 
applying the requirements of section 36 of the Constitution.300 
 
It is important to take this enquiry a step further and not only look at whether there is 
indeed a right to property that can be protected. As stated above, the competing 
interests of the host state and the foreign investor must be balanced in order create a 
mutually conducive foreign investment environment that will benefit both parties to a 
larger extent. 
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In South Africa, property rights are generally well protected and secured. According to 
the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom, South Africa scored 67,6 per cent in property 
rights protection.301  
 
3.4 POTENTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
This factor refers to the financial health and strength of the country and includes 
economic conditions of the host state, such as inflation, interest rates, growth in GDP, 
wealth distribution as well as macro-economic policies.302 Based on the study by Luiz 
and Charalambous, this factor was rated 4,1 per cent as being less important and 4 
per cent very important. 
 
The increasing interdependence of the economic structure of modern society and the 
significant growth of the general price system and complex credit system have 
increased the responsiveness of economic markets to political conditions.303 In this 
regard, the market size and depth may influence the current as well as the potential 
future growth rates.304 
 
Generally, developing countries that have been successful in attracting continued FDI 
are those with high economic growth rates and strong demographics. They are also 
benefitting from structural reforms, or are in the process of implementing those 
reforms. The state of a country’s economy is measured by the size of its annual GDP, 
which is the final value of all its goods and services produced during a year.305 In South 
Africa it is determined by Statistics South Africa.306 There are different measures that 
are used to calculate the GDP. Each measure describes economic performance from 
a slightly different angle.307 To calculate the performance of the country, it is important 
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to observe the complete picture with all measures taken into account rather than 
looking at one aspect only.308 
 
In South Africa, the consumer-orientated investment landscape is rather saturated and 
with economic growth being weak and in decline, it has not been an attractive 
destination for FDI. The local consumer also faces an uphill battle against high 
unemployment, rising inflation and elevated debt levels. Political uncertainty and the 
perception of corruption have further clouded investor sentiments towards South 
Africa. 
 
The overall growth of the South African economy was 0,7 per cent in the third quarter 
of 2016. This is a 0,4 per cent increase in the first nine months of 2016 compared to 
the first nine months of 2015.309 The South African economy grew by an overall 
percentage of 0,2 in the third quarter quarter-on-quarter (compared to 3,5% in the 
second quarter) of 2016. The mining sector was the main positive contributor to growth 
in the third quarter in 2016.310 After shrinking by 17,5 per cent in the first quarter, the 
mining industry recovered strongly in the second quarter, growing by 16,1 per cent.311 
The growth rate of 5,1 per cent in the third quarter was mainly the result of increased 
production in mining of metal ores, particularly iron.312 
 
The activities related to the local government elections in August 2016 also contributed 
positively to economic growth.313 For example, the payment of additional salaries to 
temporary electoral staff and the increased spending on goods and services increased 
the general government services by 1,8 per cent.314 The finance industry also recorded 
a positive growth (1,2 per cent), as did personal services (0,6 per cent), construction 
(0,3 per cent) and transport (0,3 per cent).315 
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Statistics South Africa recorded four industries that decreased in the third quarter of 
2016. Firstly, the agriculture sector declined by 0,3 per cent for the seventh consecutive 
period per quarter. This was due to the worst drought that South Africa had 
experienced in recent years. Secondly, the trade industry recorded its first contraction 
since the second quarter of 2015, declining by 2,1 per cent.316 This was largely as a 
result of a lacklustre performance in the wholesale, retail and motor trade, as well in 
catering and accommodation sectors.317  
 
Third, the electricity, gas and water industry declined by 2,9 per cent in 2016.318 This 
was the result of the implementation of water restrictions across the country, together 
with waning electricity consumption.319 Lastly, the manufacturing industry declined by 
3,2 per cent in the third quarter of 2016 as a result of the decline in the production of 
petroleum and chemicals, as well as basic iron, steel, food and beverages.320 The 
heavy debts of the country may also have negatively affected the country’s GDP. 
 
The controversy surrounding President Jacob Zuma and the ANC is set to worsen in 
2017, putting the country’s economy at greater risk and damaging regional stability. 
According to the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom, South Africa currently has a world 
economic ranking of 81.321  
 
3.5 THE RULE OF LAW 
The rule of law is an important feature of the Constitution and is a fundamental principle 
of a constitutional democracy. This principle is often equated with the German term, 
Rechtsstaat and they are generally used interchangeably.322 The rule of law is the 
founding value of the Constitution323 and it could be interpreted to mean that the 
governors and the governed should be bound by the same set of rules.324 Therefore, 
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any act that does not comply with the law must be declared invalid in so far as it does 
not comply.325 
 
However, there is no agreement on the scope and the content of the rule of law, 
although scholars agree that it is an enforceable principle of law.326 The rule of law has 
been invoked in many cases by the South African courts to challenge an act of 
parliament or the executive. For example, in the case of Fedsure Life Insurance LTD 
and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others,327 
the powers of the Johannesburg local government to levy substantially higher property 
rates were challenged.  
 
In this case, the court held that: 
“…the rule of law to the extent at least that it expresses this principle of legally is 
generally understood to be a fundamental principle of constitutional law. It seems 
central to the concept of our constitutional order that the legislative and the executive 
in every sphere are constrained by the principle that may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law”.328 
 
It is clear from the quote that the government may not perform its function beyond that 
which is granted to it by the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa. This is a 
noble feature of the South African Constitution as it prevents the government from 
acting in its own interests.to the detriment of others. From the foreign investor’s 
perspective, it means that they may challenge directly any conduct by the government 
should it have acted beyond its conferred powers.  
 
According to the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom, South Africa scored 59,7 for 
judicial effectiveness.329 The judicial system has been weakened as a result of political 
interference and frequent political infighting that undermined the government’s 
integrity.330  
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3.6 OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY 
The concept of transparency is closely linked to the protection and promotion of foreign 
investment. In this context, transparency denotes a situation in which the players in the 
investment process are able to obtain sufficient information from each other in order to 
make informed decisions, and to meet obligations and commitments. This ensures that 
the special needs of both parties are met. Transparency also promotes accountability 
between the participants in foreign investments.  
 
There is no agreed precise definition of transparency, and it is a generally used and 
undefined term.331 It depends mainly on the context in which it is used and who is using 
it.332 In the context of FDI, transparency may refer either to access to public information 
with respect to investor-state proceedings and/or increase in public participation in the 
proceedings themselves.333 
 
In terms of the UNCTAD, transparency entails…  
“The concept of transparency is closely associated with promotion and protection in the 
field of international investment. In the present context, transparency denotes a state 
of affairs in which the participants in the investment process are able to obtain sufficient 
information from each other in order to make informed decisions and meet obligations 
and commitments. As such, it may denote both an obligation and a requirement on the 
part of all participants in the investment process.”334  
 
The concept of transparency may strengthen or weaken the relationship between the 
foreign investors and the host state. In foreign investment, transparency is required 
from the host state in such areas as regional, bilateral and multilateral treaties as well 
as national legislation. Both the host state and the foreign investor are required to be 
transparent during the pre-inception stages and post-inception stages. Therefore, 
transparency is already required during the pre-inception stages and must continue up 
to the ultimate inception of the investment in the host country. It is therefore essential 
that the judicial system of the host country be transparent and partial, at all times. 
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A study by the OECD and IMF shows that there is a strong positive nexus between 
FDI inflow and the quality of government.335 A number of countries have adopted 
access to information laws to demonstrate efficiency in government for the purpose of 
attracting investment that is critical to economic development.336 The transparency of 
the government when executing its duties plays a very important role in economic 
development on the national and international level. The principle of transparency may 
be included in national law, regional and international agreements. 
 
This enables the foreign investor to make an informed decision about investing in a 
particular country. Both participants must be prepared to subject their activities to 
public scrutiny as and when the need arises. However, in the context of FDI, 
transparency is usually viewed from the foreign investor’s perspective.337 Emphasis is 
placed on the obligation of the host state to provide full access to information required 
by the foreign investor.338 However, the host state is not precluded from accessing 
information about the foreign investors for the purpose of policy making and regulatory 
purposes.339 The precise degree of the transparency of information to be disclosed will 
be determined by the circumstances of the case.340  
 
Non-transparent laws continue to hinder private investment, and it faces additional 
restrictions that impede efficiency.341 This is because a lack of transparency also 
shields government officials from accountability.342 Developing new or changing 
existing regulations without public consultation result in transparency problems343 
There are exceptions to the disclosure of information, namely, 
1. if it is for the purpose of national security and defence; 
                                                          
335 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “Foreign Direct Investment -Maximising 
Benefits, Minimising Costs” https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf 
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
336 Ibid. 
337 Calamita N J “Dispute settlement transparency” 2014 The Journal of Would Investment and Trade 
283. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Nixo R “Transparency obligations in international investment agreements: A paper presented at the 
seminar” 
https://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/876/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=International_investment_ag
reements.htm (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid.  
54 
 
2. if is for the purpose of law enforcement and legal processes and is the subject matter 
of judicial process or under investigation; 
3. internal policy deliberations and premature disclosure of issues will hinder such 
deliberations; 
4. the protection of commercially confidential information or information that may affect 
the right of individuals to privacy.344 
 
The functions of the government are the following: 
(a) to consider, pass, amend or reject legislation on any subject that falls within its 
jurisdiction; 
(b) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are 
accountable to it; 
(c) to maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority, including the 
implementation of legislation; and 
(d) to maintain oversight of any organ of state.345 
 
In attempting to enforce transparency, the Constitution grants parliament powers to 
intervene, by passing legislation when it is necessary to maintain national security, 
economic unity and essential national standards.346 It is clear that the obligation 
imposed by the concept of transparency cannot be escaped without good cause. It 
confronts areas where secrecy in investment law has been a long-standing and firmly 
defended hallmark and pushes investment law towards an increasingly public 
regime.347 
 
According to the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom, South Africa scored 47,6 per cent 
for government integrity. This is below average, and may be worrisome to foreign 
investors, because the integrity of a host state is directly linked to its transparency on 
a host of different factors. 
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3.7 THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION 
A general theme under discussion is that countries with large populations provide 
many opportunities, ranging from growing purchasing power to a demand for 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare, to education. FDI is often targeted to selling goods 
directly to the country involved in attracting the investment.348 Therefore, the size of 
the population and scope for economic growth will be important for attracting 
investment in such circumstances.349 Countries with large populations offer scope for 
new markets that attract FDI.350  
 
For example, car firms invest and build factories in a country in order to meet the 
demands of a growing consumer class.351 Small countries may be at a disadvantage 
because it is not worth investing on such a scale for a small population.352 Based on 
the study by Luiz and Charalambous, this factor was rated 1 as being less important353  
Based on the United Nations estimates, the current population of South Africa is 
55,279,705 as of Monday, 27 February 2017 based on the latest United Nations 
estimates.354 This means a large population, which may positively influence FDI inflow. 
 
3.8 EXCHANGE RATE CONSIDERATIONS 
These factors can affect a country adversely if it is going through a currency crisis, or 
experiencing intense volatility.355 The exchange rate may affect expected rates of 
return of FDI. Exchange rates can influence both the total amount of foreign direct 
investment that takes place and the allocation of this investment spending across a 
range of countries.356 A currency depreciates when its value declines relative to the 
value of another currency.357 The implications of the exchange rate for FDI is that it 
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reduces that country’s wages and production costs relative to those of its foreign 
counterparts.358  
 
Based on the study by Luiz and Charalambous, this factor was rated 3 as being 
important overall, with 1 being less important and 4 being important.359 This factor may 
affect the FDI inflow in the developing countries, although it is often difficult to predict 
if local policies are erratic and it needs to be well understood especially with regard to 
future local operations and strategies.360  
 
3.9 OPENNESS TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE 
INCENTIVES 
Openness to trade deals with the restrictions on trade that are placed on goods and 
service to be imported the country. It is generally expected that there will be more FDI 
inflow if a country is open to regional and international trade. This is because openness 
to free trade tends to promote free trade, which encourages more investment.361  
 
What determines South Africa’s average tariff rate? Imports of some agricultural 
products face additional barriers and state-owned enterprises operating in several 
sectors of the economy may affect the tariff rates of the country. The financial system 
which has been evolving gradually and the resilient banking sector which remains 
relatively sound have also played a role in the determination of the tariffs of the 
country.362 The market must not only provide for higher investment, but also for higher 
quality investment. 
 
Big multinationals, such as Apple, Google and Microsoft have sought to invest in 
countries with lower or favourable corporation tax rates.363 For example, Ireland has 
been successful in attracting investment from Google and Microsoft. Trade is important 
to South Africa’s economy and may influence FDI. The value of exports and imports 
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together equals 63 per cent of South Africa’s GDP.364 Numerous state-owned 
enterprises distort the economy, and recent efforts to ban foreign ownership of land 
and facilitate expropriation may discourage foreign investment.365 According to the 
2017 Index of Economic Freedom, South Africa’s investment freedom decreased to 40 
per cent. 
 
The financial sector is one of the largest among the emerging markets and includes 
sophisticated banking and bond markets, and plays a very important role in influencing 
FDI inflow.366 The top personal income tax rate was 41 per cent in 2016; this rate has 
now been increased to 45 per cent for 2017.367 The top corporate tax rate was 28 per 
cent in 2016.368 Other taxes include a value-added tax and a capital gains tax.369 The 
overall tax burden equals 22,6 per cent of total domestic income in 2016.370 Based on 
the study by Luiz and Charalambous, this factor was rated 1 and as being less 
important.371 South Africa currently has an overall tax burden of 70,2 per cent. The 
government spending has been 32,4 per cent of total GDP for the past three years.372  
 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
The factors of FDI inflow have been discussed above. To a certain degree, these 
factors play an important role in influencing FDI inflow. According to Luiz and 
Charalambous, the most important factors are a country’s governance, political 
stability, political economic growth, and openness and transparency. These factors 
have more than 4 ratings out of 5. South Africa currently ranks 81 on the world 
economic ranking with an overall rank of 62,3 per cent.373 
 
The next chapter deals with the protection of FDI accordance with international law. 
This chapter first looks at the reasonable protection of foreign investment at an 
                                                          
364 2017 Index of Economic Freedom “World Rank: South Africa” 
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/southafrica (Date of use: 11 April 2017). 
365 Ibid.  
366 Ibid.  
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Luiz J M & Charalambous H “Factors influencing foreign direct investment of South African financial 
services firms in Sub-Saharan Africa” 2009 International Business Review 314. 
372 2017 Index of Economic Freedom “World Rank: South Africa” 
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/southafrica (Date of use: 11 April 2017). 
373 Ibid.  
58 
 
international level. Second, it looks at the contractual guarantees emanating from BITs. 
Third, it looks at different international minimum standards of treatment. Forth, the 
chapter looks at the protection of investment through dispute resolution. Firth, the 
chapter looks at how foreign investment is protected in China. Lastly, the chapter deals 
with other international institutions that indirectly play a role in the protection and 
promotion of foreign direct investment. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since FDI is one of the main sources of economic growth, it is important for a host 
state to ensure that foreign investors receive adequate protection for their investment. 
The level or extent and scope of FDI protection play an important role in investment 
inflow and economic growth of the country. However, in as much as foreign investors 
are entitled to have their investment protected, the protection is not absolute and can 
be limited in certain circumstances. Moreover, the protection must be fair to both the 
host state and the foreign investor. A question arises as to what constitutes fair 
protection, as there are certain benefits that may not be reasonable for both parties.  
 
This chapter looks at the protection of foreign investment from the investor’s point of 
view. It also looks at different international minimum standards of treatment374 provided 
for in international investment law. There is a nexus between these IMST, even though 
they are different and do not have to be applied at the same time. The IMST is defined 
as  
“a norm of customary international law, which governs the treatment of aliens, by 
providing for a minimum set of principles which States, regardless of their domestic 
legislation and practices, must respect when dealing with foreign nationals and their 
property”.375 
 
Generally, states have a discretion to have the IMST included in their international 
agreements or domestic legislations. There are also similarities between these IMST 
concerning foreign investment protection. The IMST is essentially similar to standards 
of justice and treatment accepted by the civilised nations and may even include a 
standard higher than the one that the state applies against its own nationals.376 The 
main aim of these IMSTs is to protect foreign investment in the host state. These 
standards may be found in domestic law as legislation, as well as in international law 
in the form of the BITs. There IMST is generally contained in the traditional BITs.  
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Although the international IMST is popular in the international investment community, 
there is no expressly agreed specific formulation of IMST.377 As a result, it is not clear 
what the meaning and practical application of IMST as a general rule of foreign 
investment law sets out.378 It is also not clear which actions by host states can violate 
the IMST.379  
 
To a certain degree foreign investors rely on obligations by the host state when 
deciding in which state to invest.380 It sometimes happens that existing conditions at 
the time of the conclusion of an agreement may have changed later on. Therefore, 
foreign investors need to be protected from changing laws of host states that may 
adversely affect foreign investors. 
 
4.2 THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HOST STATE AND THE 
FOREIGN INVESTOR 
The relationship between the host state and the foreign investor is unique and comes 
into being after the host state and the investor’s home state have entered into a BIT.381 
The parties are required to reach an agreement with regard to the dynamic terms and 
conditions of their agreement.382 The new generation of BITs now requires a 
relationship between host state and investors to be based on several key factors, such 
as transparency in authoritative decision-making, impartiality of domestic and 
international courts, effective remedies being made available for disputes, and an 
overall strong framework for international investment law.383  
 
These factors are essential for the host state to maintain strong regulatory and 
administrative frameworks, in order not to risk losing the flow of foreign investments.384 
For this reason, the demand for international investment laws that protect and govern 
such a relationship is increasing.385  
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 Protection by law might have its limitations under certain circumstances and the 
foreign investor must weigh the risks and the benefits before deciding whether to invest 
in a country. Nothing compels the foreign investor or the host country to enter into an 
agreement with each other.  
 
4.3 THE REASONABLE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Foreign investors must be afforded reasonable protection in accordance with the 
traditional rules and regulations of international investment law. However, the extent 
of this protection is not clearly defined within the international investment community, 
and it is often based on the terms, the scope and the content of the agreement between 
the parties. The conclusion of BITs brings about obligations for both the host state and 
the foreign investor. However, the extent of such obligation depends on the scope of 
the terms of such agreement. 
 
The reasonableness of the protection of foreign investment in the host state depends 
on whether the foreign investor has been granted minimum international acceptable 
treatment by the host state and the test for determining such, should be objective. BITs 
are usually structured in such a way that they provide foreign investors with high levels 
of substantive and procedural protection.386 
 
The protection of FDI is reasonable if firstly, foreign investors are protected by 
international agreements where their rights are not protected under existing domestic 
laws.387 Second, international agreements should encourage host states to adopt 
market-oriented domestic policies that treat foreign investors fairly.388 Lastly, they 
should support the development of international law standards consistent with these 
objectives.389 
 
Foreign investment may also be protected through by contractual guarantees, the 
purpose of which are is to provide foreign investors with reasonable protection by 
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prohibiting host states from introducing changes in their legislative or administrative 
framework which might adversely affect investors’ rights.390  
 
The introduction of international minimum standards for the treatment of foreign 
investors as a customary rule of international law dates back to the nineteenth century 
when foreign interests expanded in domestic territories.391 During this period, the 
international minimum standards of treatment focused on the rights of foreign investors 
to the exclusion of national investors.392  
 
What constitutes ‘treatment’, and does it require a comparison of the entire third-party 
treaty or only the clause conferring treatment or merely part of the provision conferring 
protection of FDI? Does the word ‘treatment’ refer only to rights or also to remedies for 
the violation of such rights?  
 
Investment treaties import their own language and thus the extent of the investor’s 
protection varies.393 However, the core standards of foreign investors’ protection are 
virtually universal.394 These IMST include the fair and equitable treatment, the most 
favoured nation standard, the national treatment, and the full protection and security 
standard. 
 
In the Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil (US) v Republic of 
Estonia,395 the claimant sought to recover losses related to its investment in an 
Estonian financial institution. The ICSID tribunal, after having considered whether 
certain actions of the Bank of Estonia amounted to a violation of its obligation to accord 
“fair and equitable treatment” and “non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary treatment” 
under the US-Estonia 1994 BIT, dismissed the claim. In its consideration, it described 
the standard as follows: 
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“..Under international law, this requirement is generally understood to ‘provide a basic 
and general standard which is detached from the host State’s domestic law’. While the 
exact content of the standard is not clear, the Tribunal understands it to require an 
‘international minimum standard’ that is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, 
a minimum standard”.396 
 
It is important for a foreign investor to investigate whether the host state has a BIT 
agreement in place with the investor’s home state. Once the foreign investor has 
established that the home state has a BIT with the host state, the foreign investor must 
enquire about the scope and the extent of the protection in terms of that BIT. This will 
be used as a point of departure when negotiating or renegotiating the contractual 
guarantees with the host state. There are further factors that the foreign investor must 
take into account when negotiating agreements with a host state, namely, the duration 
of the BIT, the political and economic risk in the host state, the size of the population 
of the host state, and previous precedents of national and international insurance 
schemes and the availability of the protection.397  
 
The IMST are qualified by international law. Therefore, in a case of a dispute, specific 
rules of international investment law are used to determine the responsibility of states 
for injury to foreign investors.398 Each specific rule determines the scope of the IMST 
that international law affords foreign investors.399  
 
Vandevelde suggests that BIT provisions generally rest on six standards, namely, 
access, security, non-discrimination, reasonableness, transparency and due 
process.400 Principle of security refers to the protection of property rights and 
contract.401 Non-discrimination refers to equal justice under law. The principle of 
reasonableness refers to the prohibition of arbitrary conduct by the government and 
not necessary by a person.402 The principle of transparency requires that laws and 
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policies be made public.403 Lastly, the principle of due process requires a notice and 
an opportunity to be heard.404 The same principles apply to the protection of investment 
because these standards are the main tools for the protection for foreign investment. 
  
The IMST originally dealt with both the personal security of foreign investors and the 
protection of their investments405. However, the international investment community 
held this to be advantageous to foreign investors only and it was abolished.406 At 
present, the protection applies to foreign investments only and is not extended to the 
investor.407  
 
The principle of equality requires that foreign investors are treated equally within the 
realm of international law. Equal treatment consists of absolute standards and relative 
standards of treatment.408 Absolute standards of treatment are ‘non-contingent’ and 
are granted without regard to the way in which others are treated.409 These include 
provisions for ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’.410 On the 
other hand, relative standards are treatment that is contingent and granted with 
reference to the treatment given to others. These include provisions for ‘most favoured 
nation’ and ‘national treatment’.411 
 
The concepts of fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, non-discrimination 
and most favoured nation are all expressions of the guarantees for investors and could 
increase the flow of foreign investment in the host state.412 
 
Two fundamental conventions aimed at protecting foreign investments adopted under 
the auspices of the World Bank, are the International Centre for the Settlement of 
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Investment Dispute Convention413 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
Convention.414 The ICSID Convention deals with the settlement of investment disputes 
between a host state and a foreign investor.415 The MIGA Convention establishes a 
scheme for insuring foreign investments against political, currency and other risks.416  
SADC also provides for the protection of foreign investment through the SADC Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary.417 The SADC BIT Template 
provides a clear example of a shifting approach to investment governance in Southern 
Africa. The SADC Model BIT was developed in accordance with the overall goal of the 
SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment to promote the harmonisation of SADC 
member states’ investment policies and laws.418  
 
4.4 CONTRACTUAL GUARANTEES AIMED AT PROTECTING FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT  
4.4.1 The stabilisation clause 
A stabilisation clause is a provision in an agreement between a state and an individual 
investor whereby the state agrees not to use its sovereign and/or legislative powers to 
change the provisions of the agreement.419 In this instance, the state undertakes to 
exempt the foreign investor from any changes that it may introduce in its legislation, or 
from administrative measures of a general application, whenever their effect would be 
to significantly reduce the economic return expected from the investment.420  
 
The purpose of this clause is to freeze the law that was applicable at the time of the 
conclusion of an agreement. This occurs when state A enters into an agreement with 
company B and includes a provision stipulating that the law applicable at the time of 
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concluding the agreement will remain, even if the law of the state should change at a 
future date. Naturally, this would limit the powers of the state, because even if its law 
changes, these changes will not have an effect on the agreement that has already 
been concluded.  
 
The reverse aspect of the stabilisation clause would, of course also benefit investors, 
as the law had already been frozen since the conclusion of the contract. As with any 
other contractual agreement, the parties have the right to choose the terms in the 
stabilisation clause.421  
 
Any amendments in the legislative and administrative framework of the host state may 
affect the economic return on an investment as originally forecast, and/or the foreign 
investor's ability to continue to operate in the country in terms of the agreed 
conditions.422 
  
Generally, a stabilisation clause should contain three sub-sections.423 Firstly, the 
clause should state that the rights conferred by the agreement would remain 
unaffected by subsequent legislation or administrative actions.424 Second, it could state 
that the agreement will prevail over any future legislation or administrative regulation, 
should there be any inconsistency between the agreement and such legislation or 
regulation.425 Finally, it must ensure that the agreement will be interpreted and applied 
in accordance with the domestic law that was applicable at the time of the conclusion 
of the agreement.426 
 
 4.4.2 The renegotiation clause 
In certain circumstances, a state is prohibited from waiving or limiting sovereign 
prerogatives because of its obligation to govern in the public interest.427 For this 
reason, the stabilisation clause may not be the best option for the host state, and it 
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may be necessary to insert a renegotiation clause in the agreement. Thus, the 
renegotiation clause allows the host state and the foreign investor to insert a clause in 
their agreement, which provides for the renegotiation of the terms of the agreement in 
future.  
 
Renegotiation of a contract can be defined as that which creates a dialogue between 
parties and a common pursuit for an agreement with the objective of harmonising 
respective behaviour in order to reach a mutual convergence of opposite interests to 
maintain a contractual relationship upon revised conditions.428 The renegotiation 
clause is applied when the terms and conditions of the agreement are fundamentally 
modified.429 The renegotiation clause is likely to provide effective protection, unless 
there is a prescribed objective such as restoring the economic equilibrium or default 
option if the negotiation fails, for example, payment of compensation by the state.430  
 
The VC on the Law of Treaties states that agreements should be interpreted in good 
faith.431 The principle of good faith applies to the negotiation, formation and 
renegotiation of an international agreement, and the rights and obligation of the 
parties.432 The parties must exercise good faith at the first stage of the formation of an 
agreement.433 The principle of good faith imposes behavioural requirements on the 
contracting parties with the option of renegotiating of the contract should difficulties 
arise.434 Both parties are prohibited from causing prejudice and/or betraying, or from 
taking advantage, of the other party.435  
 
Good faith therefore, is the foundational principle of foreign agreements and parties 
cannot contract without good faith.436 The parties are required to negotiate their 
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agreement in good faith. Lack of good faith from either party could lead to finding legal 
grounds for the renegotiation of the agreement.437  
 
Renegotiation clauses offer protection against changes in economic circumstances. 
For example, an alteration of the agreed upon goods, their price, supply and sale may 
lead to the renegotiation of a contract.438 However, an unforeseeable change in 
circumstances per se does not give rise to a claim for renegotiation.439 Whether a 
foreign investor has a claim for renegotiation will have to be judged on the 
circumstances of each case.440  
 
Therefore, it is important for the parties to clearly define events and elements, which 
may trigger the renegotiation of an agreement. The parties must also clearly define 
how renegotiation should occur.441 
 
4.4.3 The umbrella clause 
 Under customary international law, a violation of an agreement entered into with a 
foreign investor by a host state does not give rise per se to international responsibility 
on the part of the state.442 In order to enforce stronger standards of protection in favour 
of foreign investors, the so-called 'umbrella clauses' have been inserted into BITs since 
the 1950s.443  
 
The first Arbitral Tribunal to have applied an umbrella clause is believed to be the ICSID 
Tribunal in the Fedax v Venezuela444 based on the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Venezuela BIT. In this case, the tribunal was unaware that there was an umbrella 
clause, and did not carry out any in-depth examination of the clause or its application. 
It simply applied the ‘plain meaning’ of the provision, that commitments should be 
observed under the BIT, to the promissory note contractual document. It found that 
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Venezuela was under the obligation to “honour precisely the terms and conditions 
governing such investment, laid down mainly in Article 3 of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Venezuela BIT, as well as to honour the specific payments established in 
the promissory notes issued”.445  
 
The scope of the umbrella clause was first evaluated in the SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance, S.A. v Pakistan446 case. The Tribunal held that a breach of contract is not 
an automatic breach of a treaty. The Tribunal held that Article 11 of the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Venezuela BIT does not purport to state that breaches of contract 
alleged by an investor in relation to a contract it has concluded with a state are 
automatically elevated to the level of breaches of international treaty law.447 
 
The inclusion of an umbrella clause into the BITs by contracting states creates an 
exception to the general rule of the autonomy of municipal legal systems, on the one 
hand, and international legal systems, on the other. For this reason, a mere violation 
of an agreement may be elevated to a violation of international law.448 This is because 
the obligation assumed by the agreement has been internationalised.449 For example, 
should a host state be in breach of an investment contract that is protected by the 
umbrella clause, the aggrieved foreign investor might sue for such a breach in terms 
of international investment law. 
 
The umbrella clause seeks to bring under the protecting “umbrella” of the treaty 
obligations of the states that arise out of instruments other than the treaty itself.450 One 
such instrument is a contract, which is the legal tool utilised by FDI agreements.451 
 
The question arises as to whether the natures of a treaty obligation and that of a 
contractual obligation are the same or at least similar, so as to render them amenable 
to interchangeable application in the investment context. If the answer to this is in the 
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affirmative, then it may be argued that a contractual obligation can indeed be elevated 
to a treaty obligation with a simple reference in an umbrella clause.452  
 
Jaemin453 argues that if a contractual obligation and a treaty obligation are inherently 
distinguishable, forcing a contractual obligation into a treaty obligation may almost 
amount ‘to putting a square peg into a round hole’.454 He points out that the violation 
of an agreement is justified when it is not necessarily provided for in the agreement 
itself, but by international investment law.455  
 
However, regardless of the specific provisions of an agreement, a host state may still 
have recourse to a necessity defence regarding a measure taken in times of economic 
emergency.456 Should an aggrieved foreign investor decide to resolve the dispute via 
international dispute resolution mechanisms, such investor is precluded from seeking 
remedies in terms of domestic law, if the remedy will benefit of the host state.457 
 
Gaillard 458 is of the view that the natures of a treaty obligation and that of a contractual 
obligation are similar. He makes this argument by referring to the effects of an umbrella 
clause as the ‘mirror effect clause’ because if there is a violation of a contract, the 
umbrella clause, like a mirror, reflects it as a violation of BITs. In his argument, he 
states: 
“I myself prefer to call it a ‘mirror effect clause’ because in fact it is a mirror effect 
which it creates. You have a violation of the contract, and the Treaty says, as if you 
had a mirror, that this violation will also be susceptible to being characterised as a 
violation of the Treaty. So the same facts, the same breach will be a violation of the 
contract in itself, and a violation of the Treaty”.459 
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Investment protection is also provided through the Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,460 which contain grounds that are regarded as 
wrongful in international law. They include both the actions and the omissions of 
states.461 The acts of a host state can be construed as internationally wrongful when 
there is conduct consisting of an action or an omission that is attributable to the host 
state under international law, and when such conduct constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the host state.462 
 
However, Article 12 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of State requires that the 
obligation must be in force at the time of occurrence of the act. This means that if the 
conduct of the host state occurs before the parties have entered into an agreement 
that contains an umbrella clause or any other clause aimed at protecting foreign 
investment, the host state is not in breach an international obligation.  
 
4.4.4 The governing law clause 
As a general rule, law is not static and may be amended to suit circumstances of a 
particular government at a particular time. Furthermore, states have a sovereign right 
to regulate their territory in the public interest. The question arises as to whether such 
right is absolute. The answer is no. An international agreement usually imposes 
restrictive rights and obligations on the host state.463 For example, the host state is 
obliged to regulate in a way that does not discriminate on the basis of nationality.464 
The host state also has an obligation to provide a minimum accepted standard of 
treating foreign investors, as required by international law, to compensate an aggrieved 
foreign investor in the event of an expropriation, and to allow transfers of funds from 
and to the investment.465 
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However, under customary international law, states have a sovereign prerogative to 
allow entry of foreign investment in their territory.466 The host state also has a right to 
regulate the operation of foreign investment after an entry in its territory, 
notwithstanding the terms of the agreement signed.467 This is because the host state’s 
foreign investment legal framework is essentially applicable within its boundaries 
only.468 
 
For this reason, the foreign investor may be in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the host 
state. The assumption is that parties have the autonomy to choose the law which will 
be applicable to their investment agreement.469 For this situation to be balanced out, 
the host state and the foreign investor may enter into an agreement, whereby both 
parties choose the law that will govern their investment agreement470 by inserting a 
clause which stipulates the applicable law, whether it be domestic or international law, 
or both. The choice-of-law clause is to ensure that the investment agreement is not 
subject to the laws of the host state without the consent of the foreign investor.471  
 
There are various ways of determining the governing law of an international 
agreement. For example, the parties may refer to international law by name or to its 
sources, or by implication472 in the hope that that the protection of the foreign investor 
against the host state will be increased.473 If the parties choose international law as the 
applicable law, their legal relation is removed from the particular domestic legal 
system.474 
 
4.4.5 The Internationalisation of an agreement  
Owing to states’ obligations states to serve the citizens within their territory, they may 
frustrate agreements with foreign investors, should such agreements be governed by 
domestic law.475 States may change their domestic laws, through legislative process 
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or by executive action.476 As a result, they may exonerate themselves from the 
obligations of the agreement with a foreign investor and thereby prejudice the foreign 
investor in the process.477  
 
To avoid this, the host state and the foreign investor may enter into an agreement to 
remove their legal association from a particular domestic legal system478 by 
internationalising their agreement. Once they has been done, the agreement is neither 
governed by domestic, nor international law, but by its own legal system, by general 
principles recognised by civilised states, international treaty law which is distinguished 
from domestic or international law and international administrative contracts.479  
 
However, the internationalisation of a legal relationship only takes place within the 
parameters set by domestic law.480 Furthermore, the parties are not allowed to 
circumvent international obligations arising from their agreement.481  
 
4.4.6 The expropriation clause  
Generally, the expropriation of another party’s property without consent is wrong and 
at times unlawful. However, the taking can be acceptable if carried out for public 
purpose, using due process and with compensation.482 A BIT usually contains a 
guarantee against the expropriation of foreign investment without compensation.483 
This guarantee removes any fear of expropriation that the foreign investor may have 
in the prospective host state.484 Lowe485 suggests that “when one thinks of unlawful 
interference with the interest of the foreign investor, it is natural to think first of 
expropriation”.486 
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Vaughan argues that although the taking of property into public ownership, like 
nationalisation and expropriation, is not inherently improper, the abusive or 
uncompensated interferences with property rights of foreign investors, and 
unpredictable interferences with those rights, are always disruptive, and that such a 
risk creates a poor environment for foreign investment.487 It was for this reason that 
that investment protection agreements came into being in order to encourage FDI.  
 
Expropriation clauses are usually included in investment treaties and domestic 
legislation. Furthermore, the extent, scope and content of these clauses are dependent 
on the terms agreed upon by the parties. However, there is a large degree of 
consensus among states on the criteria of a lawful expropriation. They agree that the 
taking of the foreign investor’s property must be: 
• effected by due process of law; 
• for a public purpose; 
• non-discriminatory; and 
• made against the payment of compensation as required by 
international law.488 
 
If these requirements are not met, the taking may be unlawful and the foreign investor 
may submit a claim against the host state for compensation or even restitution in 
certain circumstance. For example, the taking of the foreign investor’s property to 
retaliate against the foreign investor’s home country is unlawful and does not meet the 
requirements for lawful expropriation.489 
 
4.5 THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN TERMS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 
4.5.1 The most favoured nation standard of treatment 
The concept of the IMST is a complex one. For example, what is a minimum standard 
of treatment that a host state owes the foreign investor? Who determines the content 
and scope of the IMST? Do states have an inherent obligation to provide foreign 
investors with IMST? 
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Generally, the IMST provides foreign investors with a number of post-establishment 
rights.490 These are the rights accorded covered foreign investors once their 
investments have been admitted to the territory of one of the contracting states. Many 
BITs qualify these rights by allowing the contracting parties to provide privileges to 
certain foreign investors, should these have arisen from inter alia economic integration 
or taxation agreements.491 
 
If a foreign investor fails to secure a desired standard of protection from the BIT by way 
of negotiation, the party still has a chance of being a beneficiary of that protection by 
virtue of the MFN clause.492 The MFN standard originated from the old Friendship 
Commerce and Navigation treaties.493 These FCN treaties included a provision giving 
companies from the signatory countries the right to hire the executive personnel of 
their choice, or employer choice provision in their operations abroad.494 
 
The definition of the MFN standard is contained in Article 4 of the International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on Most Favoured Nation clause495 and states that; “a most-
favoured-nation clause is a treaty provision whereby a state undertakes an obligation 
towards another state to accord most-favoured nation treatment in an agreed sphere 
of relations”.  
 
This occurs where state A and State B sign a BIT that contains an MFN clause, and 
state A affords more favourable treatment to foreign investors of state C. In this 
instance, foreign investors of state B are entitled to a higher favourable treatment than 
the one offered to foreign investor of state C.496  
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The MFN standard requires non-discrimination between different foreign investors by 
the host state.497 The principle of non-discrimination is a central feature of BITs, which 
typically provide for most favoured-nation treatment and national treatment. The MFN 
is distinguished from the national treatment standard because the MFN standard 
ensures that foreign investors covered by the BIT are not discriminated against, 
relative to other foreign investors, while the national treatment standard ensures that 
they are not discriminated against, relative to domestic investors.498  
 
Therefore, the host state is under an obligation to extend a favourable treatment to 
foreign investors from the moment it grants such treatment to an investor from a third 
country.499 This may impose heavy costs on the host state. However, the ‘right to claim’ 
approach limits the responsibility of the host state to extend favourable trading 
conditions to a foreign investor only when the claimant makes such a claim.500 The 
MFN clause may also be found in domestic laws. It is in the discretion of the state to 
include the MFN clause in their domestic laws, policies and regulations. 
  
Like the national treatment standard, the MFN standard is relative because it defines 
the required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other investments in 
similar circumstances.501 It enables foreign investors of the contracting parties to 
benefit from favourable treatment that may be afforded to nationals of a third state by 
either contracting state.502 
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In terms of foreign investment law, the application and scope of the clause is divided 
into two categories, namely, the substantive protection and the procedural protection, 
also known as dispute settlement.503 The substantive protection means that no foreign 
investor of any state is allowed to bring a claim directly against other foreign states.504 
Procedural protection entails the protection of foreign investment in the form of 
remedial action.505 It is universally accepted that the MFN clause applies to substantive 
rights.506 However, it remains highly controversial as to whether the MFN clause should 
equally apply to procedural rights.507 
 
The purpose of the MFN standard is to afford the foreign investor, who is one of the 
contracting parties to a BIT, a favourable trading condition in the host state.508 Another 
purpose of the MFN standard is to guarantee a favourable treatment to the nationals 
or companies of one contracting state in the territory of the other, if the host state grants 
a favourable treatment to the nationals or companies of a third country.509 Furthermore, 
the MFN standard can be used to grant equality in trading conditions and not to grant 
superiority, or to guarantee the combination of advantageous rules and standards in 
BITs.510 
 
 The MFN standard affords foreign investors more favourable treatment than available 
under customary international law.511 In general, the MFN standard prohibits the host 
state who is a party to a BIT, from granting foreign investors of other contracting states 
more favourable trading conditions.512 This means that one party to the agreement is 
not allowed to grant better trading prices and rates to foreign investors of third parties 
than those granted to foreign investors of the contracting party.513 
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Furthermore, if the host state grants a foreign investor from a third state favourable 
treatment, an obligation arises for the host state to grant foreign investors of the 
contracting states, at least the equivalent treatment to that afforded to a third party.514  
 
4.5.2 The fair and equitable treatment standard 
The origin of the FET standard can be traced back to early customary international 
law. However, there is no precise definition of this standard, as there is no consensus 
between writers, arbitrators, scholars and judges on what precisely constitutes a FET. 
Notwithstanding, this concept has not been precisely defined; it has been used in 
international arbitration to evaluate the appropriateness of a government’s conduct that 
does not easily qualify as a form of expropriation.515 
 
The Havana Charter for the International Trade Organisation516 was the first instrument 
to contain a reference to the ‘equitable’ treatment accorded to the investment of a 
foreign investor.517 Article 11(2) of the Charter states that the International Trade 
Organisation518 could make recommendations for and promote bilateral or multilateral 
agreements on measures designed to assure just and equitable treatment for the 
enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from one member country to 
another.519 In Africa, the FET standard was referred to for the first time in the Report 
of the Forth Season Asian African Legal Consultative Committee.520 
 
Although none of these agreements came into force, some of the US treaties on 
friendship, commerce and navigation began to incorporate the terms ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment.521 
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The FET standard brings in the elements of fairness and equity drawn from customary 
international law.522 However, the precise meaning of the terms ‘fair and equitable’ is 
a controversial one.523 In terms of this standard, the host state is required to afford 
foreign investment of the contracting states to a BIT a fair and equitable treatment. 
 
The FET standard is absolute in the sense that it requires the host state to accord 
foreign investors’ fair treatment in terms of their own defined content, though their exact 
meaning has to be determined by reference to specific circumstances of application.524 
Furthermore, it has its own meaning, and is not necessarily satisfied by treating an 
investor in the same way the host state treats its own nationals, or other foreign 
investors of third parties.525 Therefore, the court decisions regarding the FET standard 
depend on the circumstances of each case.526 
 
In the Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka527 case, Judge Asante, 
in his dissenting opinion noted the connection of “fair and equitable treatment” with “full 
protection and security” and assumed that they each connoted the same level of 
treatment. He then considered the meaning of fair and equitable. He further stressed 
that the fair and equitable standard conformed to the international minimum standard. 
 
The Elettronica Sicula Spa (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), the ICJ held that 
the requirement for constant protection and security, as expressed in the FCN treaty 
between Italy and the United States, was not a warranty to a U.S. investor that no 
disturbance in any circumstances would occur. Furthermore, the ICJ held that the 
requisition by an Italian government entity of an insolvent Italian company partially 
owned by the U.S. investor did not violate the requirement. The Court also ruled that 
the requirement was to be measured by the “minimum international standard” that the 
requirement was to be measured by the “minimum international standard”.  
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However, Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion reviewed the travaux préparatoires 
and preamble to the Supplementary Agreement. He held that one of the underlying 
principles of this Agreement and the Treaty it supplemented was that “of equitable 
treatment”. 528 With this in mind, he concluded, inter alia, that a requisition order issued 
by the Italian authorities against ELSI deprived the shareholders of their rights of 
control, and constituted a violation of the principles of equitable treatment.529 
 
It is not clear whether the FET standard is a higher standard than the general 
international minimum standard of treatment. However, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement530 Commission issued an interpretative statement indicating that the FET 
as used in NAFTA does not contemplate a higher standard than the international 
minimum standard in customary international investment law. 
 
The FET standard is further said to be flexible because its content and application can 
be adjusted to accommodate new definitions.531 For this reason, it is believed to have 
been the most invoked treaty standard in investor-state arbitration, which is present in 
almost every single claim brought by foreign investors against host states.532 
 
The SADC BIT Model Template also makes provision for the fair and equitable 
treatment of foreign investors. It obligates the host state to accord to investments or 
investors of the other contracting state a fair and equitable treatment, in accordance 
with customary international law prescription on the treatment of foreign investors.533 
 
The FET standard further prohibits the host state from abusing its powers. For 
example, the host state may not unreasonably refuse to meet its contractual 
obligations.534 The host state may also not abuse its powers to evade agreements with 
                                                          
528 The Elettronic Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (US. V. Italy), 1989, I.C.J. page 15. 
529 Ibid. 
530 The North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter referred to as NAFTA). 
531 Lawal O S “Variability of fair and equitable treatment standard according to the level of 
development, governance capacity and resources of host countries” 2014 Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 229. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Article 5(1) of the SADC BIT Model Template. 
534 Martin A M “Proportionality: an addition to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes’ Fair and Equitable Treatment standard” 2014 Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review 62. 
81 
 
investors, and/or act in bad faith during the execution of the contract.535 The violation 
of the FET standard is the allegation most used by foreign investors before the 
international investment tribunal.536 The host state may resort to justifying grounds, 
depending on the circumstances in a situation where it may not have granted the 
foreign investor a FET. In such cases, the host state may use justifying grounds such 
as consent, necessity, force majeure, distress and/or self-defence to the extent that 
they are proportionate and satisfy relevant standard of treatment.537 
 
The FET standard contains of four elements, namely, fair procedure, non-
discrimination, legitimate expectations, transparency and proportionality.538 Fair 
procedure refers to the notion of due process, denial of justice and the required judicial, 
and/or administrative proceedings for the protection of the rights and interests of 
foreign investors.539 A discriminatory intention of the host state may contribute to the 
finding of a violation of the FET standard.540 The host state may however justify the 
existence of discriminatory behaviour by proving the existence of reasonable grounds 
for such discrimination.541 Foreign investors have a right to the protection of their 
legitimate expectations - by the wording of the preamble of an agreement, and by 
stability and consistency in the overall legal framework of the host state.542 
 
The host state’s legal regime must also be open and clear. This means that the entire 
relevant legal requirements for initiating, completing and successfully handling the 
investment must be easily accessible to foreign investors.543 The element of 
proportionality prohibits the host state from placing unreasonable or unnecessary 
strain on the foreign investment.544 In other words, the host state may only limit the 
rights and interests of a foreign investor if such limitation is reasonable and necessary.  
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4.5.3 The national treatment standard 
The national treatment standard generally prohibits discrimination based on the 
nationality of the foreign investor. Unlike the FET, the national treatment standard 
defines the required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other 
investments in similar circumstances.545 Unlike the MFN standard, the national 
treatment standard requires non-discrimination between domestic and foreign 
investors by the host state.546 
 
The national treatment standard is a controversial one between civilised states. The 
main issue is the responsibility of a host state to treat foreign investors and nationals 
of the host state equally.547 The purpose of the national treatment standard is to grant 
foreign investors a treatment that is similar to that accorded domestic investors trading 
in the host state.548 For example, if state A accords its domestic investors a tax rate of 
fourteen per cent, the foreign investors of state B, which has an agreement with state 
A, are entitled to the same rate. 
 
Generally, the host state has no inherent responsibility to afford a foreign investor more 
protection than its nationals do.549 This only comes into operation if the contracting 
states have entered into a BIT and inserted the national treatment clause. This 
provision prohibits the contracting states to a BIT from discriminating against the 
nationality of the other party.550 This means that foreign investors should be treated in 
the same way as domestic investors. This standard further puts an obligation on the 
state to be mindful of the investor’s rights and interests. The scope of this standard is 
in the discretion of the parties, and varies from BIT to BIT.551  
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The national treatment is a relative standard in that the violation of the foreign investor’s 
right is determined by how the host state treats its domestic investors in like 
circumstances.552 The ‘like circumstance’ component requires a determination of the 
similarities of circumstances of foreign and domestic investors.553 The criteria used to 
determine the ‘like circumstances’ criteria are generally limited to commercial 
considerations in business sectors.554  
 
When determining whether the foreign investor has been subjected to less favourable 
treatment by the host state, the arbitration tribunals tend to focus on the effect of the 
measure on the foreign investor, rather than on the purpose or motive behind the 
measure taken.555 For this reason, foreign investors receive more protection, although 
this is at the detriment of the host state. 
 
Article 2(2) (c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States provides556 for 
the national treatment standard. However, the capital-exporting states argue that 
foreign investors should be treated in accordance with the international minimum 
standard only, rather than affording them national treatment.557 Sornarajah558 argues 
that that the acceptance of the national treatment will reduce foreign investment 
protection, because it will leave them without any remedy in international law.559 The 
national treatment standard provides FDI protection at the pre-entry and post-entry 
stages. At the pre-entry stage, it creates a right of entry into the host state and a right 
of establishment of business.560 The post-entry stage affords the foreign investor a 
right to be treated equally with domestic investors.561  
       
The SADC Model BIT recommends the inclusion of a provision ensuring that each 
contracting state “accords foreign investors and their investments a treatment no less 
favourable than the treatment it accords, in ‘like circumstances’, to its own investors 
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and their investments with respect to the management, operation and disposition of 
investments in its territory”.562 The SADC Model BIT also recommends, however, that 
SADC member states qualify this provision by scheduling a list of present and future 
non-conforming measures, sectors and activities, which will be permanently excluded 
from the scope of the national treatment provision.563  
 
The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment564 makes an exception to the national 
treatment. It provides that all SADC member states must establish conditions favouring 
the participation of least-developed countries of the SADC in the economic integration 
process, based on the standards of non-reciprocity and mutual benefit.565  
 
4.5.4 The full protection and security standard 
The full protection and security standard is not as popular as the other standards of 
treatment. For this reason, it is less frequently applied during investment dispute 
resolutions.566 There is also a paucity of cases or literature dealing with this standard. 
In a broad sense, the standard of full protection and security refers to the protection of 
rights of property and contract.567 The full protection and security standard prohibits 
the states from using force or violent means against foreign investors’ investments.568 
  
The full protection and security standard further prohibits the host state from impairing 
the FDI.569 This standard requires the host state to avoid the use of unreasonable 
violence or force against the foreign investor’s property, if such violence or force cannot 
be avoided.570 In other words, the obligation against the host state is not to refrain from 
causing damage, but to exercise due diligence, or to take reasonable steps to prevent 
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the damage against the property of a foreign investor.571There must be a causal link 
between the action of the host state and the investment prejudice suffered by the 
FDI.572 This means that the state is only liable for its own actions and not those of a 
third party. 
 
The violation of this standard can only be used as a last resort, and the foreign investor 
is entitled to compensation.573 However, this provision only comes into effect if the 
contacting states to a BIT provide for it, it is not inherent.574 It is not clear whether the 
full protection and security standard is a subjective or an objective standard. However, 
the due diligence obligation upon the host state means that the host state is required 
to take all reasonable measures of prevention which a host state in similar 
circumstances is expected to take.575 
 
The application of the full protection and security standard may overlap with the FET 
standard. Examples of these overlapping applications may occur in the following 
circumstance:  
(a) just like the FET standard, the full protection and security standard may be 
breached, even if there is no physical impairment of the investors’ investment;576 
(b) in the case of Occidental Exploration and Production Company v the Republic 
of Ecuador,577 the tribunal held that if it is established that there has been a 
violation of the FET standard, it becomes moot to enquire whether there had in 
addition been a violation of the full protection and security standard.578 This is 
because the treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically entails an 
absence of full protection and security.579 
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4.6 THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT THROUGH DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
4.6.1 The investor-state dispute resolution: its nature, scope and content 
The protection of foreign investment may effected by an arbitration clause by the host 
state and the foreign investor or the contracting states. The arbitration clause allows 
the choice of neutral forum for the settlement of disputes that may arise from an 
investment agreement.580 As a result, access to justice can be improved significantly 
with the implementation of dispute resolution.581 
 
Investment disputes brought under the BITs are subject to unique so-called 
international dispute settlement proceedings.582 Various dispute resolution 
mechanisms exist, such as negotiation, consultation, conciliation, use of good offices, 
panel procedures, arbitration, judicial settlement, and reference to the International 
Court of Justice.583 Under the applicable FDI law, the provisions in the BITs allow 
individual investors to initiate their own legal action directly against the host state, to 
claim for violation of certain provisions of the BITs.584 
 
Dispute resolution mechanisms are important because they allow an aggrieved party 
to seek remedy. Most modern BITs contain dispute settlement clauses, providing for 
different forms of settling investment disputes between states and foreign investors of 
other contracting states.585  
 
Formal dispute resolution requires the parties to submit their disputes for 
adjudication;586 usually takes place in a court setting,587 with the ICJ being responsible 
for the adjudication of foreign investment disputes at an international level. 
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The ICJ is a judicial branch of the United Nations and was established by the Charter 
of the United Nations as its principal judicial organ.588 The ICJ consists of independent 
judges,589 fifteen members590 who are selected by the General Assembly, and the 
Security Council.591 There are many advantages to resolving disputes through in-court 
litigation.592 For example, the procedures are clear, there are standardised rules, the 
decision is out of the parties’ hands, and there is a right to appeal.593 
 
Despite the advantages of formal dispute resolution mechanisms, the downside is that 
court proceedings can often take years until a judgment is passed, during which time 
attorneys’ fees may accumulate.594 For this reason, parties to an investment dispute 
may opt for informal dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration, 
which, in recent years, have become increasingly popular because of their confidential 
nature and time and cost effectiveness.595 
 
In terms of the informal mechanism (also known as alternative dispute resolution), the 
parties submit their dispute to the arbitral tribunal, or to the ICSID, which was 
established in terms of the 1930 Hague Agreement.596 It functions within the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.597 The PCA is an inter-governmental organisation that 
provides various dispute resolutions to the international community598 Apart from 
formal dispute mechanisms; the PCA also provides informal dispute resolutions, such 
as mediation and conciliation.599 
 
Mediation can be defined as a method of non-binding dispute resolution involving a 
neutral third party, that tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable 
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solution.600 The third party, who is not personally involved in the dispute, is chosen by 
and must be acceptable to both the disputing parties.601 The mediator’s decision is 
binding only if the parties come to a mutually agreeable settlement.602 Arbitration unlike 
mediation is binding to both parties. Arbitration is a dispute-resolution process in which 
the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to make a final and 
binding decision resolving the dispute.603 
 
Although these mechanisms vary, they are typically not tied to a fixed procedural 
framework because they favour practical solutions that require compromise and 
negotiation.604 A common method of informal dispute resolution is mediation.  
 
In an informal dispute resolution, the parties have the discretion to choose the mediator 
or arbitrator, as well as to change procedural rules, such as the language of the 
proceedings and the location of the hearings.605 The informal dispute resolution entails 
taking the matter to arbitration, mediation or conciliation.606 The informal dispute 
resolution processes are likely to be less costly than domestic courts or international 
arbitration, because they are not as legalised and do not require the establishment of 
liability, and accompanying specialised legal counsel.607  
 
The lack of autonomy may sometimes be problematic for the following reasons. Firstly, 
it prevents foreign investors from experimenting with different provisions from various 
third-party treaties.608 There do not seem to be significant reasons for allowing foreign 
investors to select only a single set of more generous dispute settlement provisions 
from just one third-party treaty.609 However, allowing foreign investors to use multiple 
provisions from multiple treaties renders the MFN clause wholly effective, although it 
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could be considered partly inconsistent with the interpretative rule enshrined in the VC 
on the Law of Treaties because it disregards a context of the BIT.610 
 
Second, the absence of a waiting period with regard to the exhaustion of local remedies 
is more favourable.611 Third, the local courts may, in certain circumstances, provide 
less favourable remedies than international arbitration.612 Fourth, other clauses require 
the parties to first attempt to settle the dispute amicably, the foreign investor to first 
submit the dispute to domestic courts for a certain period, and that the dispute has not 
been resolved.613 Lastly, some of the BIT clauses narrow the scope of the definition of 
an investment and an investment dispute.614  
 
It is clear that although the BITs offer protection of foreign investment, certain 
provisions of BITs severely limit the availability of direct arbitration between investors 
and host states. For example, the requirement that foreign investors exhaust local 
remedies before they may approach international institutions is a disadvantage.615  
 
Investment may also be protected through the ICSID. The main function of the ICSID 
is to resolve foreign investment disputes at an international level.616 It is within the 
scope of the ICSID Convention to promote international investment; hence, it provides 
mechanisms to assist in the resolution of disputes related to such investments.617 The 
ICSID does not have an automatic jurisdiction over foreign investment disputes. For 
this reason, consent is the key element of dispute resolution under the ICSID and 
Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention has established its importance.  
 
The truth is that international law cannot be enforced in domestic courts, no matter how 
effective the domestic legal system is.618 This is one of the main reasons why the ICSID 
was created. Article (1) prohibits parties to the arbitration from withdrawing consent 
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unilaterally. Article 26 grants the host state powers to require the exhaustion of local 
administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under the 
ICSID Convention.  
 
Article 25 (1) also establishes jurisdiction of the ICSID over any legal dispute arising 
directly from an investment between a host state and the foreign investor. The ICSID 
Convention provides for the ICSID arbitration rules, in terms of which arbitration will be 
based on the laws of the member state and the relevant foreign investment law.619  
Harten lists the advantages of arbitration as follows:  
(i) “Investors are authorised to bring claims against states in relation to most or all 
aspects of the treaty rather than a more limited class of potential disputes, such 
as those involving the amount of compensation to be paid in the event of an 
expropriation; 
(ii) Investors can bring claims in arbitration forums at which voting power is 
concentrated in the major capital-exporting states (e.g. the World Bank) or an 
international business organisation (e.g. the International Chamber of 
Commerce); 
(iii) Investors can bring claims without having to exhaust local remedies in the host 
state, regardless of whether those remedies would deliver justice; 
(iv) Investors can submit contractual disputes with the host state or a state entity to 
the arbitration mechanism under the investment treaty, even where the contract 
itself requires the resolution of disputes in another forum; 
(v) Arbitrators are authorized to regulate and discipline states based on broadly 
framed standards, such as protection from unfair or inequitable" treatment and 
from expropriation or deprivation; 
(vi) Arbitrators are authorized to review the conduct of virtually any branch or entity 
of the state; and 
(vii) Arbitrators are authorized to award monetary compensation, as opposed to 
conventional public law remedies, where the state is found retrospectively to have 
violated its treaty obligations.”620 
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The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment621 also provides for dispute resolution 
in Article 28. The parties concerned may either refer the matter to the SADC 
Tribunal,622 the ICSID, an international arbitrator, or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to be 
appointed by special agreement or Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law.623 However, they must first exhaust all local remedies 
before they can submit a claim to international arbitration.624  
 
4.7 THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EXAMPLE OF CHINA 
This section looks at FDI protection in China. It focuses on why China is used as an 
example in the study, where it is in terms of legal framework protecting foreign 
investment, and how these legal frameworks protect FDI. 
 
The reason why China was chosen for the study is that it has four characteristics in 
common with South Africa. Firstly, both are developing countries; second, they are 
both member states of the BRICS, third, like South Africa, China is currently in the 
process of reviewing its foreign investment law, 625 and finally, China was also isolated 
from the world market, although its isolation was self-imposed.626 China is a one of the 
largest countries with a high inflow of FDI and has more than 100 BITs in force to 
protect foreign investment.627 
 
However, the first generation of Chinese BITs did not adequately protect the foreign 
investor,628 which had a significant effect on the economy of China.629 When this was 
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realised and China decided to pro-actively embark on the negotiation of new liberal 
investment treaties.630 It further initiated a gradual shift towards stronger provisions for 
substantive and procedural foreign investment protection.631 Today, Chinese BITs 
contain almost all standard provisions found in mainstream European-Country BITs.632 
 
The Investopedia633 mentions six factors that influence foreign investment in China. 
They are: capital availability, competitiveness, regulatory environment, the economic 
stability, positive market and business climate, and openness to regional and 
international trade.634 Since 2000, when China overtook the United States as the world 
largest recipient of foreign capital, China’s FDI inflow has increased.635 China’s inflow 
of FDI is dependent on infrastructures such as roads and bridges, resources 
productivity and development of the business value chain.636 These have enabled 
foreign investors to generate profit with regard to their investment. 
 
The size of the Chinese population presents the promise of economic growth.637 China 
is the world's largest nation with a population of more than 1, 35 billion638 with the 
world’s fastest growing and second largest economy.639 Like South Africa China is 
currently embarking on a process of reforming and reviewing its foreign investment 
law. China has published a Draft Foreign Investment Law of the Peoples’ Republic of 
China, Draft for Comments,640 on 19 January 2015 for public comments.641 It will repeal 
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the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint 
Venture Law, and the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law.642 These were laws that 
regulated FDI in China and that are currently in force until such time that the China 
Draft Foreign Investment Law repeals them.  
 
The China Draft Foreign Investment Law is aimed at regulating foreign Protection of 
Investment Activities which includes inter alia foreign investment protection.643 For 
more than two decades, China has been advocating the protection of foreign 
investment644 inter alia by acceding to the ICSID Convention in 1993.645 In this regard, 
China notified the ICSID Secretariat that it would only agree to refer issues of 
compensation for expropriation to ICSID arbitration and that consent for arbitration 
would be given on a case-by-case basis.646 The treaties signed in the following years 
included the ICSID arbitration clause in line with that notice.647 
 
Chapter 7 of the China Draft Foreign Investment Law deals specifically with the 
protection of foreign investment. Foreign investors are protected against inter alia the 
illegal or ultra vires conduct by a state organ.648 Foreign investors are also allowed free 
inbound and outbound transfer of their legal property.649 Protected property include 
capital contributions, profits, income from asset disposal or compensations and/or 
indemnities acquired in terms of the law.650 
 
The China Draft Foreign Investment Law also covers foreign investment protection of 
levy, expropriation, state compensation, transfer and the intellectual property right.651 
The China Draft Foreign Investment Law further protects foreign investment by way of 
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investment dispute resolution.652 The 2008 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Investment Policy Review of China653 aligns inward FDI flows more 
closely with national priorities, including upgrading industrial sophistication, supporting 
innovation, setting up outsourcing industries and developing poorer hinterland 
regions.654 The economic growth of China has also been strengthened when it decided 
to Go Global in 2001.655  
 
These policies have been successful in attracting and promoting foreign investment in 
China.656 The China Draft Foreign Investment Law is regarded as a positive sign of the 
Chinese government’s determination to relax restrictions on foreign investment.657 
Foreign investor confidence has been sustained by China’s economic strength.658 
 
Currently, foreign investment in China is regulated by the Catalogue of Industries for 
Guiding Foreign Investment659 and the Catalogue of Special Administrative Measures 
for Foreign Investment,660 which are published by the Minister of Commerce and the 
National Development Reform Commission.661  
 
Although China’s domestic laws provides for the protection of foreign investments, a 
more systematic and stronger protection for foreign investors is reflected in its 
investment treaties.662 China currently has more than 100 BITs in place, which were 
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negotiated and entered into under its traditional BIT model.663 China and the USA are 
currently in the process of negotiating and concluding a BIT. This is an important 
milestone for China because the US-China BIT664 will break away from the Chinese 
traditional BIT model in at least two significant respects.665  
 
Firstly, the US-China BIT includes a ‘negative list’ that will be released by the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China.666 The State Council is also known as 
China’s Central People’s Government, and it is the highest executive organ of state 
power and administration.667 The negative list will set out industrial sectors in which 
foreign investment is limited, as well as investment thresholds for foreign 
investment.668 Sectors on the negative list will be off-limits to each party. 
 
The negative list will reduce the number of sectors, which may form the basis of market 
access under pre-establishment national treatment.669 Foreign investments outside of 
the negative list will enjoy the same national treatment as domestic investors and may 
register with the China Administration for Industry and Commerce670 directly.671 
Currently, foreign investments require governmental approval.672 The China Draft 
Foreign Investment Law has done away with this requirement.673 In other words, 
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foreign investors will no longer be subject to a separate regulatory regime, but will 
receive the same treatment as domestic investors.674 Therefore, the adoption of the 
pre-establishment national treatment principle for foreign investment ensures there is 
no need for foreign investors to apply for approval unless the investment falls within 
the negative list.675 
 
In terms of the China Draft Investment Law, foreign investors will no longer be subject 
to a separate regulatory regime from domestic investors, but will be given the same 
treatment as domestic investors.676 Therefore, the adoption of the pre-establishment 
national treatment principle for foreign investment ensures that foreign investors need 
not apply for approval, unless the investment falls within the parameters of the negative 
list.677 By agreeing to a ‘negative list’ approach, China has signalled its willingness to 
allow foreign investment in all industries and sectors of its economy.678 The US-China 
BIT also contains all the standard provisions in the international BIT model.679  
 
Secondly, the US-China BIT signals China’s willingness to allow non-discriminatory 
access to its market at all stages of investment.680 This would protect pre-Protection of 
Investment Activities and is expected to open the Chinese market to more US 
companies and afford greater certainty for investments in various sectors.681 The US-
China BIT presents the most significant opportunity for companies of both parties to 
address barriers in their respective market.682 The number of BITs that China has 
entered into shows its willingness and openness to international trade. It is clear from 
the above discussion that China has taken extra steps to promote and protect foreign 
investment in its territory. 
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4.8 OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS THAT INDIRECTLY PLAY A ROLE 
IN THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
4.8.1 Introduction 
Various international institutions play a role in the promotion and protection of FDI. 
These institutions do not have objectives that deal directly with the promotion and 
protection of FDI. Their protection emanates from their host and home countries being 
member states to these international institutions. 
 
4.8.2 The United Nations 
The UN came into being by the Charter of the United Nations.683 The Charter of the 
UN is a multinational treaty, which serves as the Constitution of the UN and binds all 
member states.684 The UN is responsible for the promotion of economic development 
through the Economic and Social Council.685 The main task of the Economic and Social 
Council686 is to make recommendations about economic matters, and to draft 
Conventions for submissions at the UN General Assembly.687  
 
4.8.3 The United Nations, General Assembly 
The UN General Assembly is an organ of the United Nations. It is responsible for 
facilitating discussions and making recommendations regarding economic matters.688 
In this regard, it has made various resolutions on international economic matters 
through the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.689 The Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States focuses on the development of friendly relations 
among nations and the achievement of international co-operation in solving 
international problems in the economic and social sectors.690 Chapter one of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties deals with the Fundamentals of the Charter.  
 
It deals with, inter alia, 
1. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples,  
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2. Peaceful settlement of disputes, 
3. Remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force and which 
deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal development, 
4. Fulfilment in good faith of international obligations,  
5.  Respect for human rights and international obligations and 
6. International co-operation for development.691 
 
Chapter 2(2)(a) gives states a right to regulate and exercise authority over foreign 
investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations. 
However, it does not oblige states to grant preferential treatment to foreign investors. 
As said above, the obligation to provide foreign investors a preferential treatment only 
arises out of an agreement between the parties. Because of the nature of the Charter 
on Economic Rights and Duties of States resolutions, they merely create ideals rather 
than a legal framework within which international trade can be conducted.692  
 
4.8.4 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law693 was established by the 
UN General Assembly.694 Its general function is to ensure the harmonisation and 
unification of international trade law.695 It provides recommendations and guidelines 
regarding international conventions, model and uniform laws for acceptance by the 
states.696 These conventions and model laws can be applied to and by individual 
traders and investors.697  
 
The UNCITRAL plays a role, firstly, in promoting wider participation in existing 
international conventions.698 Second, it is involved in the preparation and adoption of 
new international conventions, models laws and uniform laws.699 Third, it promotes 
wider acceptance of the international trade terms and customs, which play a role in 
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ensuring a uniform interpretation and application of international conventions, domestic 
laws and modern legal developments, including case law.700  
 
4.8.5 The International Monetary Fund  
The International Monetary Fund701 constitutes a core sector of international economic 
law. International trade and international business rest on cross boarder payment and 
capital movements, which as a rule affect two or more currency areas.702 In 1944 at 
the Conference of Bretton Woods, the creation of the IMF, its Articles of Agreement 
and the creation of the World Bank were accepted. 703  
 
The aim of the IMF is to create an international monetary order based on the free 
convertibility of currencies.704 The IMF also ensures free movement of payment and 
capital and payments in conformity with the requirement of internal trade.705 
Furthermore, the IMF oversees exchange rate practices of states and assists 
governments with balance of payments problems by selling them foreign currencies.706 
The IMF has a flexible system of international payments in place, which seek to 
eliminate restrictions that may hamper the growth of the world trade.707  
 
This in turn promotes international trade and investment by improving the legal 
framework within which trade and investment can be conducted.708 If an international 
businessman or foreign investor is unable to pay for imports, business is hampered. 
For this reason, foreign investors benefit from the IMF because states can afford to 
repay loans against lower interest rates.709 The IMF ensures that foreign investors or 
importers are able to conduct business by obliging states not to impose restrictions.710 
However, an individual foreign investor or trader does not obtain rights directly from 
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the IMF Articles of Agreement, and may also not enforce their rights in domestic 
courts.711  
 
4.8.6 The World Bank 
The World Bank is an important institution that assists in the economic development 
of its member states. It acts as a source of financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries around the world.712 It provides loans and technical assistance 
for specific projects to member states, private enterprises and foreign investors within 
the boundaries of its member states.713 Economic development assistance is directed 
at poor countries by providing them with long-term soft loans.714 These loans allow 
developing countries to access funds and sustain economic development,715 enabling 
them to provide better rates for foreign investment. 
 
4.8.6 Conclusion  
This chapter addressed various ways in which foreign investment may be protected in 
terms of international minimum standards of treatment, contractual guarantees and 
dispute resolution. It further dealt with how China protects foreign investors in its 
territory how international institutions play a role in the protection of FDI. The next 
chapter deals with the protection of foreign investment in South Africa. It looks at 
different, laws, regulations and policies aimed at protecting foreign investment.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The protection of foreign investment is a sensitive issue, and so are the different legal 
methods employed in protecting and regulating investment, which differ considerably, 
depending on the different jurisdictions. South Africa nationalised the FDI legal 
framework, the South African government arguing that the legal systems as enshrined 
in the Constitution, legislation and the judiciary are robust, independent and fair, and 
that there is no need to settle disputes with foreign investors via international forums.716 
The main purpose of the investment legal framework is to make the country a globally 
preferred investment jurisdiction.  
 
In evaluating the investment legal framework in South Africa, the rights of foreign 
investors are evaluated below to determine their effectiveness. It is significant to 
determine the extent to which South African courts enforce foreign investors’ rights 
when foreign investment matters are referred to them.  
 
Equally important is the extent to which international law influences jurisprudence in 
South Africa and the government’s track record in observing international legal 
obligations. These factors play a role in an overall evaluation of the existing legislative 
environment that a foreign investor would have to take into account when making an 
investment in the country. 
 
5.2 THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
5.2.1 The Constitution in context and its recognition of international law 
During the apartheid era, South African courts did not enforce international law, 
including human rights law or resolutions of the UN.717 The apartheid government did 
not conclude BITs.718 Most actions of the government during this time were contrary to 
the principles adopted in various international human rights agreements.719 In 1993, 
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the South African government introduced the Interim Constitution,720 which was 
replaced by the current Constitution in 1996. The 1993 Interim Constitution gave 
recognition to international law under sections 82(1)(i) and 231(2). These provisions 
are included in the Constitution, which entrenched customary international law in the 
judicial system.  
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, binds all branches of government, and 
supersedes all rules made by the government or the courts.721 Therefore, any laws or 
rules of procedure that do not meet the constitutional muster would be deemed 
invalid.722 This is borne out in the preamble and in section 2 of the Constitution. The 
Constitution is the founding document of the country723 and any law or conduct must 
be consistent with it to be valid.724  
 
The Constitution is founded inter alia on the value of rule of law.725 The rule of law is 
an enforceable principle on which the exercise of public powers and legislative acts 
can be challenged.726 The rule of law comprises the following three main features:  
 public power may only be exercised in terms of the authority conferred by law; 
 everyone is equal before the law, and the law applies to everyone equally; and 
 ordinary courts are responsible for enforcing ordinary laws of the land.727 
 
Section 232 of the Constitution recognises customary international law as binding, 
unless it is contrary to the Constitution or to an Act of Parliament. Furthermore, in terms 
of section 233 the courts are required to choose a reasonable interpretation of 
legislation consistent with customary international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with customary international law. It is clear from these 
provisions that international law is recognised and binding in South Africa. 
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Furthermore, international agreements and treaties to which South Africa is a party 
create binding legal obligations at an international level.728 South Africa is a signatory 
to a number of international treaties in areas including investment, trade, defence, 
taxation, customs unions and various other political agreements. 
 
5.2.2 Foreign investor’s rights and obligations in terms of the Constitution 
In order to determine the scope and extent of the protection of FDI in South Africa, it is 
important to ascertain the definition of a juristic person. For this to be assessed, the 
following questions are analysed. Does the term ‘juristic person’ include a foreign 
investor? Does the term ‘everyone’ also include foreign investors? Does the term 
‘juristic person’ mean a South African juristic person, or is it extended to foreign 
entities? Do foreign investors have legal standing to enforce rights such as the rights 
to free trade, equality, access to information, property and privacy, as contained in the 
BOR?  
 
The Protection Investment Act defines an investor as an enterprise, regardless of 
nationality, making an investment in South Africa.729 On the other hand, the Companies 
Act,730 in its definition of a juristic person includes a foreign company and a trust, 
irrespective of whether or not it was established within or outside the Republic South 
Africa.731 Since the Companies Act includes a foreign company in the definition of 
juristic person, one can conclude that a foreign investor is also a juristic person in terms 
of the Constitution. Therefore, a foreign investor is entitled to the same rights conferred 
to domestic investors and other entities. This means that a foreign investor is entitled 
to the rights and benefits contained in the BOR. 
 
The Bill of Rights732 contained in the Constitution is applicable to both natural and 
juristic persons.733 Section 8(4) of the Constitution provides that a juristic person is 
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entitled to the rights in the BOR to the extent that is required by the nature of the rights 
and the nature of that juristic person. This provision affirms that juristic persons are 
entitled to existence and rights, which are not in all respect identical to those of their 
members for the purpose of applying the BOR.734  
 
Currie and De Waal state that there are two factors that must be considered to 
determine whether the rights of a juristic person are protected by the Constitution, 
namely, the nature of the fundamental right in question and the nature of the juristic 
person.735 There are some fundamental rights that cannot be enjoyed by a juristic 
person, for example, the rights to life, human dignity and physical integrity.736 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution contains the equality clause. In terms of this provision, 
‘everyone’ is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and enjoyment 
of the law. In the case of Prinsloo v Van der Linde,737 the court interpreted section 9(1) 
to entitle ‘everyone’ at the very least, to equal treatment by our courts of law and made 
it clear that no-one is above or beneath the law and that all persons are subject to law 
impartially applied and administered.738 
 
However, section 9(1) of the Constitution is a general rule to which exceptions exist in 
section 9(2), which states that to promote equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination, may be taken.739 This provision justifies discrimination or 
differentiation based on categories of persons. However, the question arises as to 
whether this provision is not in conflict with international law. The principle of ‘non-
discrimination’ first emerged as a fundamental tenet of the GATT as well as a guiding 
principle in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, and was recently 
endorsed in multilateral instruments, such as the NAFTA, the Organisation for 
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Economic Co-Operation and Development740 and the Draft Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment and IMST.741  
  
Foreign investment is further protected by the property clause in the Constitution in 
section 25(1). Section 25(1) provides that one may not be deprived of property except 
in terms of a law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property. Section 25(2) deals with the expropriation of property and lists the 
requirements for expropriation. In terms of this section, the expropriation must be: 
(i) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
(ii) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment 
of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a 
court.  
 
The amount of the compensation, and the time and manner of payment must be just 
and equitable, reflecting a balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, and must have regard to all relevant circumstances.742  
 
5.3 THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TERMS OF THE 
PROTECTION OF PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT ACT 22 OF 2015 
5.3.1 The preamble 
The Preamble of the Protection of Investment Act recognises South Africa’s obligation 
to protect and promote investments including foreign investment. The Protection of 
Investment Act limits the scope of the application of FDI law, by requiring investment 
to be “protected in accordance with the South African law, administrative justice and 
access to information”.743 This means that FDI must be applied within the realm of 
South African law rather than FDI law.  
 
The question arises whether foreign investors under South African investment law are 
protected together with domestic investors. In terms of the Protection of Investment 
Act, an investor is defined as “an enterprise making an investment in the Republic 
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regardless of nationality.”744 On the face of it, this section treats both domestic 
investors and foreign investors equally. However, the Preamble provides that South 
Africa has an obligation to take measures to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, who were historically disadvantaged owing to discrimination.745  
 
It is clear from the provision that foreign investors are not treated equally to domestic 
investors, and therefore, the protection of FDI is limited. The Protection of Investment 
Act further provides that the government have a right to regulate in the public 
interest.746 In order to do so, government conduct may be defensible when property is 
expropriated when in the public interest. 
 
5.3.2 The right to regulate 
Section 12 of the Protection of Investment Act grants the government or any organ of 
state certain powers, for example, the power to: redress historical, social and economic 
inequalities and injustices;747 uphold the values, principles and rights contained in the 
Constitution;748 and promote and preserve cultural heritage and practices, indigenous 
knowledge and applicable biological resources or national heritage.749 Furthermore, 
the Protection of Investment Act grants South Africa powers to regulate in the public 
interest.750 
 
5.3.3 Establishment 
Section 7 deals with the establishment of investments in South Africa. Section 7(1) 
provides that all investments must be established in compliance with the laws of the 
Republic of South Africa. This means that the Companies Act751 will be applicable in 
this regard. Section 7(2) further provides that the Protection of Investment Act does 
not create a right for a foreign investor or prospective foreign investor to establish an 
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investment in South Africa. Therefore, South Africa has no obligation to establish 
investments for foreign investors or prospective foreign investors.  
 
5.3.4 The fair administrative treatment 
The Protection of Investment Act does not provide for fair and equitable treatment. 
However, it provides for fair administrative treatment. The Protection of Investment Act 
provides that:  
“the government must ensure that administrative, legislative and judicial processes do 
not operate in a manner that is arbitrary or that denies administrative and procedural 
justice to investors in respect of their investments as provided for in the Constitution 
and applicable legislation.”752 
 
This provision is problematic, because although it affords foreign investors 
administrative, legislative and judicial processes that are not detrimental to their 
investments, the protection is provided in accordance with the Constitution and 
domestic legislation. What happens when International investment law affords foreign 
investors more protection than the domestic law? Would it not be better if foreign 
investors were afforded the discretion to choose the processes that will apply to their 
investments?  
 
Generally, foreign investors invest in a country where their investments will be 
adequately protected. For example, if the host state affords foreign investors protection 
that is equal or more than what is afforded on an international level, then the host state 
will still be an investment-friendly jurisdiction. However, if International law affords 
foreign investors more protection, they will be reluctant to invest in that country. 
 
5.3.5 Legal protection of investment 
The Protection of Investment Act distinguishes between the physical security and the 
legal protection of investment. However, in this study they will be dealt with under one 
heading. The Protection of Investment Act accords foreign investors a level of physical 
security equal to that of domestic investors in accordance with minimum standards of 
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customary international law and subject to available resources and capacity.753 This 
provision does not make clear what protection foreign investors are entitled to. 
 
This provision may lead to conflict between the domestic and FDI law. South African 
law is generally subject to the Constitution.754 The Constitution states that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with it, is invalid.755 This means that the validity of FDI law 
is not measured against the rules of traditional customary law, but the Constitution. 
Therefore, in will be difficult for foreign investors to invoke this provision for the 
protection of their investments in practice. Moreover, what happens in situations where 
the international minimum standard provides security, but the resources are 
unavailable? Would foreign investors address this in terms of FDI or domestic and 
capacity? 
  
In terms of the Protection of Investment Act, FDI is protected only in terms of section 
25 of the Constitution,756 and the FDI law is not taken into account. The Protection of 
Investment Act aligns expropriation and compensation with the Constitution and 
expropriation is now subject to compensation that is just and equitable.757 
 
5.3.6 The national treatment 
As said above, the right to equality forms the cornerstone of South Africa’s legislation 
in terms of a democratic country. It is contained in section 9 of the Constitution. Section 
9 states that ‘everyone’ is equal before the law, and has a right to enjoy full and equal 
protection of the law. The term ‘everyone’ does not preclude certain persons or entities 
in this provision. The equality clause attempts to undo the social structure that 
oppressed black Africans during the pre-democratic era.758 The equality clause further 
precludes discrimination based on the grounds mentioned in section 9(3) of the 
Constitution. The term non-discrimination is ‘equality’ expressed in the negative and 
only signifies an absence of discrimination.759  
                                                          
753 Section 9 of the Protection of Investment Act. 
754 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Section 10 of the Protection of Investment Act. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Chow M W “Discriminatory equality v non-discriminatory inequality: The legitimacy of South Africa's 
affirmative action policies under international law” 2008-2009 The Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 306. 
759 Ibid. 
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The Protection of Investment Act has included the national treatment standard 
although the scope is limited. In terms of section 8(1), foreign investors and their 
investments must not be treated less favourably than domestic investors in ‘like 
circumstances’. In this instance, the principle of equality is recognised. This may 
include the treatment of a foreign investor with respect to establishment, management, 
acquisition, expansion, conduct and/or operation.760  
 
In terms of the Protection of Investment Act, ‘like circumstances’ means the 
requirement for an overall examination of the merits of the case by taking into account 
all the terms of a foreign investment, including the: 
(a) “effect of the foreign investment on the Republic, and the cumulative effects of all 
investments; 
(b) sector that the foreign investments are in; 
(c) aim of any measure relating to foreign investments; 
(d) factors relating to the foreign investor or the foreign investment in relation to the measure 
concerned; 
(e) effect on third persons and the local community; 
(f) effect on employment; and 
(g) direct and indirect effect on the environment.761 
 
This section further provides for exceptions to the national treatment standard. For 
example, section 8(4) of the Protection of Investment Act states that subsection (1) 
must not be interpreted in a manner that will require the Republic to extend to foreign 
investors and their investments the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege 
resulting from the following: 
“(a) taxation provisions in any international agreement or arrangement or any law of the 
Republic; 
(b) government procurement processes; 
(c) subsidies or grants provided by the government or any organ of state; 
(d) any law or other measure, the purpose of which is to promote the achievement of equality 
in South Africa or designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, historically 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability in the Republic; 
                                                          
760 Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle 2012 98. 
761 Section 8(2) of the Protection of Investment Act. 
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(e) any law or other measure, the purpose of which is to promote and preserve cultural heritage 
and practices, indigenous knowledge and biological resources related thereto, or national 
heritage; or 
(f) any special advantages accorded in the Republic by development finance institutions 
established for the purpose of development assistance or the development of small and 
medium businesses or new industries.’’ 
 
It is clear from the above exceptions that they apply to foreign investors only and that 
the right to a national treatment standard is not absolute. The Protection of Investment 
Act does not define the ‘like circumstances’. Furthermore, even though in theory, it 
must appear as if the ‘like circumstances’ is a good concept. It is problematic in practice 
because a foreign investor will never be in ‘like circumstances’ with domestic investors.  
 
For example, a domestic investor and a foreign investor who both invested in the same 
South African mining company, which in theory qualifies as a “like circumstances”, do 
not have equal rights even though they have both invested in the same industry. This 
is because there are certain benefits that are afforded domestic investors only by virtue 
of the fact that they form part of the categories of legal persons who are entitled to 
certain benefits even though the domestic and foreign investors are both investing in 
the same market. An example of such legal persons will be the historically 
disadvantaged. 
 
5.3.7 Dispute resolution in South Africa 
The Protection of Investment Act provides for dispute resolution in section 13. Section 
13 of the Protection of Investment Act grants an aggrieved foreign investor a right to 
approach the Department of Trade and Industry to facilitate a resolution by appointing 
a mediator. In this regard, any domestic competent court or independent tribunal or 
statutory body has jurisdiction.762 The foreign investor may utilise international 
arbitration after the exhaustion of domestic remedies, subject to the Protection of 
Investment Act, and only if the government consents to such arbitration.763  
 
                                                          
762 Section 13(4) of the Protection of Investment Act. 
763 Section 13(5). 
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This provision limits the right of foreign investors on many levels. A dispute resolution 
process may be expensive for foreign investors because they will have to seek 
domestic remedies first, before they can take a dispute to international arbitration. 
Foreign investors favour international dispute settlement panels that remove disputes 
from the host state’s political and legal systems, offering the prospect of a neutral and 
impartial hearing. The Protection of Investment Act primarily emphasises municipal 
dispute resolution over international arbitration. 
 
Furthermore, the aggrieved foreign investor may only approach international arbitration 
if the government will consent to such arbitration. Questions arise as to what will 
transpire should the government withhold consent if the request is deemed 
unreasonable and what will happen to cases where the government is also a party to 
such dispute? How will the government ensure impartiality in the resolution? It must 
be born in mind that international arbitration is subject to domestic legislation and does 
not make provision for international minimum standards of treatment. Foreign investors 
are subject to domestic laws, which by nature cater for South African nationals. An 
example of this is if the BEE legislations and policies which seek to redress the 
injustices that caused by apartheid legislation. 
 
The lack of recourse in the case of investor-state dispute settlement in the form of 
international arbitration as a primary option is one of the main concerns for foreign 
investors. For example, in the case of expropriation, a foreign investor cannot 
approach international arbitration unless the local courts have failed to deal with the 
matter. The foreign investor is also not allowed to take the matter to international 
arbitration unless the government has consented to the proceedings. How does one 
uphold the impartiality of the government in the matter, if the government that is being 
sued is the same government that must consent to international proceedings of settling 
the matter against it?  
 
The dispute resolution in terms of international law depends on whether the matter is 
between private investors, or between the state and a private investor. If the matter is 
between private investors, they can either take the matter on review through 
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international arbitration or diplomatic channels.764 With regard to investor-state dispute 
settlement, the parties to the dispute can either take the matter to international 
arbitration, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), 
or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).765 
By looking at these inconsistencies between the Investment Bill and the BITs, one can 
easily conclude that certain provisions of the Investment Bill will make South Africa a 
non-friendly investment jurisdiction. It does not allow for the diversity and flexibility 
offered by the international investment agreements. The “pull factors” of foreign 
investments such as market size and growth, the quality of the infrastructure, the 
presence of natural resources, the availability of skills and technology are crucial in 
FDI.  
The “pull factors” of investments are very low in South Africa, while the “push factors” 
like economic and social dumping are reasonably high. The introduction of the 
Investment Bill is likely to impair the economy. The South African government has 
already introduced many amendments to the MPRDA, the Labour Relations Act,766 the 
BBBEEA, and the land reform process. 
The flow of the FDI may also be affected by economic and social dumping. This occurs 
where a country lowers the price of one of its sales to operators in the domestic 
market.767 Economic and social dumping defeats the competition opponent to capture 
the market or so that the manufacturers and industry suffered losses.768  In other 
words, “dumping is selling goods at lower value than comparable like products in the 
market they have been sold”.769 Economic sanctions such as disinvestment may also 
affect the flow of the FDI.770 
                                                          
764 See s 11 of the Investment Bill.  
765 International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as the ICC). The ICC is an institution 
that promotes international trade and investment while helping business to meet the challenges of 
globalization. 
766 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA). 
767 Sibanda OS “Can BRICS house stand longer when built on dumping ground? The Impact of South 
Africa’s Anti-Dumping measures BRICS’ Intra-Trade Relations” (Paper delivered at the UNISA 
research Indaba @ Law Retreat, 28-30 April 2015) 3. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Wood R M “A hand upon the throat of the nation: economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–
2001” 2001 SMU Law Review 489. 
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A question arises as to whether the Investment Bill, if approved by parliament, will 
encourage foreign investors to invest in South Africa and thus contribute to the growth 
of the country’s economy. Entering into BITs allows the parties to insert the standard 
of treatment adequate to both parties. Most BITs contain an umbrella clause also 
known as the treatment of state obligation.771 The umbrella clause extends the scope 
and jurisdiction of the application of BITs.772  
 
Taking cognisance of the fact that the South African government has a duty to ensure 
that its nationals benefit from the country’s economic wealth, the question arises as to 
whether the enactment of the Investment Bill fulfils the constitutional requirements 
relating to securing sustainable economic development, and the promotion of 
justifiable economic and social development. Can the enactment of the Investment Bill 
protect and promote foreign investments in SA? 
The government has an obligation to enact laws that will ensure that the entire 
population will actively share in the wealth of the nation derived from the FDI within the 
realm of domestic laws and international trade laws. Therefore laws must be enacted 
in such a way that they protect the interest of international investors and secure 
ecological sustainable development while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.773 States are often confronted with the challenge of addressing their 
domestic political and economic situation while fulfilling their obligations to international 
investors who have invested in the country.774 
 
5.4 THE EXPROPRIATION BILL, 2015 AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
SOUTH AFRICA    
South Africa is currently in the process of enacting the Expropriation Bill. This will 
repeal the Expropriation Act 3 of 1975. The Constitution does not specifically define 
expropriation. In the case of Harksen v Lane,775 expropriation was defined as “the 
                                                          
771 The umbrella clause is a clause that is inserted into a BIT by which both parties make a 
commitment to each other to observe any obligation assumed by the conclusion of the BIT. See 
Salacuse J W The law of Investment treaties 271. 
772 Chaisse J and Bellak C “Navigating the expanding of international treaties on foreign investment: 
creation and use of critical index” 2015 Journal of International Economic Law 86-87. 
773 See s 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution. 
774 Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2012) 59. 
775 The Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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compulsory acquisition of rights in property by a public authority”.776 The Expropriation 
Bill also contains a similar definition to the Harksen case.777 This does not mean that 
the state must be the ultimate beneficiary in all cases for there to be expropriation.778  
 
The Expropriation Bill provides for compensation for expropriation,779 and owners will 
be offered a certain amount for their property as determined by the Valuer-general.780 
The amount offered will take into account, not only market value but also the purpose 
of the expropriation, the current use of the property, its history of acquisition, and the 
extent of direct state investment in the property,781 all of which serve to essentially 
discount the price from its market value. 
 
The Expropriation Bill allows the owner to challenge the compensation offered, but the 
owner would have to vacate the property782 and would still be expected to maintain it 
until ownership changes.783 This is problematic because an owner could relinquish the 
full value or use of their principal asset for the duration of a court case which might 
drag on for years.784 Because litigation is expensive and the outcome uncertain, 
owners would also be under considerable pressure to accept the initial below-market 
value.785 
 
Furthermore, the Bill does not contain the ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ 
compensation principles contained in the third generation BITs to which South Africa 
is a party. In essence, the Expropriation Bill will enable the state to pay for land at a 
value determined by a government adjudicator and then expropriate it in the national 
interest.786 Should the Expropriation Bill come into force, it will effectively scrap the 
                                                          
776 Id at para 36. 
777 Section 3(1) of the Expropriation Bill. 
778 Gray-Parker J “Why you should be concerned by the Expropriation Bill?” 
 http://www.privateproperty.co.za/advice/news/articles/why-you-should-be-concerned-by-the-
expropriation-bill/4573 (Date of use: 12 December 2016). 
779 Section 13 of the Constitution. 
780 Valuer-General is an office created by the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2008. 
781 Section 12.2 of the Expropriation Bill. 
782 Section 6.3 of the Expropriation Bill. 
783 Section 9.3 of the Expropriation Bill. 
784 Gray-Parker J “Why you should be concerned by the Expropriation Bill” 
 http://www.privateproperty.co.za/advice/news/articles/why-you-should-be-concerned-by-the-
expropriation-bill/4573 (Date of use: 12 December 2016). 
785 Ibid. 
786 Ibid. 
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current ‘willing buyer-willing seller' approach to land reform787 and it will essentially 
form part of a number of other pieces of legislation, which have already come into force 
or are being proposed with a view to rectifying the imbalances brought about by 
apartheid.788  
 
The way in which the government is tackling the land restitution issue has garnered 
criticism from all corners and has raised concerns about the stability of property 
rights.789 The Democratic Alliance790 argues that even though it is not opposed to 
expropriation, the party is concerned that ‘property’ was not defined which could mean 
that even intellectual property could be expropriated.791  
 
 In terms of Section 1 of the Expropriation Bill, public interest includes the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, and reforms to bring about equitable access to all South 
Africa’s natural resources and other related reforms in order to redress the results of 
past racial discriminatory laws or practices. Public purpose includes any purposes 
connected with the administration of the provisions of any law by an organ of state.792 
Indeed, as things stand, it would seem that property of any kind could be expropriated 
for any reason that could be described as a ‘public purpose’, or ‘in the public interest. 
 
Jeffery793 argues that the Expropriation Bill in its current form is as unconstitutional as 
its predecessor, the Expropriation Act of 1975 and it leaves property owners open to 
massive losses should the government decide to expropriate their homes, land or other 
property.794  
 
Just like the Protection of Investment Act, the Expropriation Bill has received criticism. 
The main concern is that the government is attempting to implement unconstitutional 
                                                          
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid. 
789 Ibid. 
790 Democratic Alliance hereinafter referred to as the DA). 
791 Dreyer A “DA to oppose problematic Expropriation Bill” https://www.da.org.za/2016/02/da-to-
oppose-problematic-expropriation-bill/ (Date of use: 15 December 2016). 
792 Section 1 of the Expropriation Bill. 
793 Jeffery A is a head of policy research at the Institute of Race Relations. 
794 Jeffrey A “The New Expropriation Bill is out and it’s still unconstitutional” 
http://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2015/02/18/new-expropriation-bill-still-unconstitutional/ (Date 
of use: 15 December 2016). 
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measures with regard to expropriation.795 The Expropriation Bill has alarmed foreign 
investors that South Africa maintains intentions to create conditions that are favourable 
for the expropriation of foreign investors’ property.796 They are concerned that 
replacing a treaty between nations with municipal law makes foreigners susceptible to 
host state politics.797  
 
Furthermore, foreign investors are alert to the threats being made by the ANC Youth 
League,798 the Economic Freedom Fighters,799 the National Union of Metalworkers of 
South Africa800 and other political formations with regard to policy changes that will 
allow expropriation and nationalisation of their property.801 The EFF, in its 2014 
Election Manifesto, called for the nationalisation of land, banks and other strategic 
industries without any compensation.802 
 
Furthermore, the ANC as the ruling party used its majority vote on the portfolio 
committee to have the Expropriation Bill adopted even though the opposition parties 
voted against it.803 The DA raised 21 objections, including that the key terms ‘property’, 
‘valuer’804, ‘expropriation’ and ‘owner’ were so loosely defined that they could have 
unforeseen consequences. The DA Member of Parliament Dreyer805 raised the issues 
as to how the value of land was to be determined, and that the authorities can, 
theoretically, take ownership before making any payment.806 
                                                          
795 Ibid. 
796 Ngwenya M The promotion and protection of foreign investment in South Africa: a critical review of 
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 2013 2015 University of South Africa Thesis (unpublished 
LLD thesis) 4.  
797 Ibid. 
798 African National Congress Youth League (hereinafter referred to as the ANC Youth League). 
799 Economic freedom Fighters (hereinafter referred to as the EFF). 
800 The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as NUMSA). 
801 Gray-Parker J “Why you should be concerned by the Expropriation Bill?” 
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802 EFF “Economic Freedom Fighters Founding Manifesto: Radical movement towards economic 
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47 of 2000. 
805 Dreyer A is a DA Member of Parliament. 
806 Mail & Guardian “Parliament approves land expropriation Bill” http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-26-
parliament-approves-land-expropriation-bill (Date of use: 15 December 2016). 
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The EFF807 opposed the Expropriation Bill because the party advocates expropriation 
without compensation to white owners, claiming that the land was stolen from black 
South Africans.808 The Inkata Freedom Party809 argued that the provisions of the 
Expropriation Bill stipulating that the expropriated owner of a property remains 
responsible for the upkeep of the property after the expropriation has taken place, is 
nonsensical.810 The UDM811 opposed the Expropriation Bill because the definition of 
‘property’ was too limited and that the land dispossession compensation date should 
be prior to 1913.812 
 
From the above, it is clear that the Expropriation Bill has many loopholes and that, in 
its current form, may give rise to many constitutional issues and investment disputes 
in future.  
 
5.5 THE BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ACT 53 OF 2003 
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
In order to deal with the injustices of the past, South Africa has implemented policies 
and programmes that are aimed at uplifting and empowering persons from the 
designated groups through the BEE programmes. The BEE is defined as  
 
“an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly contributes to the 
economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significant increases in the 
number of black people that manage, own and control the country’s economy, as well 
as significant decreases in income inequalities”.813 
 
The purpose of the BEE is to remove the anomalies and injustices that existed in South 
Africa during the apartheid era.814 The BEE is founded in terms of section 9 of the 
Constitution. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that, to promote the achievement 
                                                          
807 Economic Freedom Fighters (hereinafter referred to as the EFF). 
808 Mail & Guardian “Parliament approves land expropriation Bill” http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-26-
parliament-approves-land-expropriation-bill (Date of use: 15 December 2016). 
809 Inkanta Freedom Party (hereinafter referred to as the IFP). 
810 Mail & Guardian “Parliament approves land expropriation Bill” http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-26-
parliament-approves-land-expropriation-bill (Date of use: 15 December 2016). 
811 Ibid. 
812 Ibid. 
813 Paragraph 35 of the Codes of Good Practice on Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment, 
Code 000 of 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the CGP). 
814 Ibid. 
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of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, may be taken.  
 
The BEE Act defines broad-based black economic empowerment as the economic 
empowerment of all black people through diverse but integrated socio-economic 
strategies that include, but are not limited to;  
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises 
and productive assets; 
(b) facilitating ownership and management of the enterprises and productive assets by 
communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises and; 
(e) preferential procurement.815 
 
However, the BEE Act itself does not set any BEE targets. Rather, it provides a 
framework for the implementation of diverse but integrated BEE initiatives throughout 
the economy. The BEE targets are contained in the Codes of Good Practice816 in 
section 9 of the BEE Act. The CGP deals with the following among others:  
 it defines key terms and concepts relating to BEE (for example, the definition of 
black people);817 
 it spells out the key principles for measuring BEE in a particular business 
entity;818 
 it specifies a scorecard against which enterprises' BEE contributions or scores 
will be assessed;819 
 it provides for the independent verification of those scores; and820 
 it provides guidelines for stakeholders to draw up transformation charters.821 
 
The CGP obligates organs of state and public entities to take into account and, as far 
as reasonably possible, apply any relevant CGP issued in terms of the BEE Act.822 In 
                                                          
815 Section 1 of the BEE Act. 
816 Codes of Good Practices (hereinafter referred to as the CGP) 
817 Para 11 of the Codes of Good Practices. 
818 Para 12 of the Codes of Good Practices. 
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822 Section 10 of the BEE Act. 
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exchange, companies are awarded a BEE rating based on a scorecard.823 Only those 
entities that achieve a set number of points are permitted to enter into commerce with 
institutions of state.824 There are charters that have been agreed to by economic 
sectors that further drive the transformation plan, and companies, as part of their 
operating licences, are required to spend a percentage of profits made each year on 
corporate social responsibility programmes.825 Failure to comply with the BEE 
legislation severely limits the ability of an enterprise to engage in any economic activity 
that is within the parameters of the state.826  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the BEE Act limits the rights of foreign 
investors immensely, as it caters for the economic empowerment of black persons in 
South Africa. Generally, the BEE is a good concept that envisages remedy for the 
injustices of the past. However, the extent of its application is questionable. For 
example, more than twenty years have passed since the apartheid government ceased 
to exit. Would it not be a better idea to review the BEE policies and ascertain whether 
they could be redeveloped so as to benefit not only black persons in South Africa, but 
the country as a whole? 
 
Currently, South Africa needs FDI to boost its economic growth. However, the BEE Act 
among other laws and regulations may deter foreign investors from South Africa. The 
affirmative action programme may further limit the rights of foreign investors.827 The 
affirmative action legislation requires companies to favour qualified black 
entrepreneurs in the procurement process, to promote the advancement of blacks in 
the workplace, and to award financial assistance for study.828  
 
Affirmative action is mainly provided for in section 9(2) of the Constitution. By permitting 
legislative and other measures to be used to promote advancement of certain social 
                                                          
823 Ibid. 
824 Ibid. 
825 Ibid. 
826 Coleman M and Williams K “South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties, Black Economic 
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groups, section 9(2) views affirmative action not as an exception to the principle of 
equality, but as a means of achieving equality.829 The affirmative action and other racial 
preference policies have rarely been challenged in the past; however, their legitimacy 
is now increasingly subjected to international scrutiny.830 
 
Sibanda notes that political and socio-economic transformation in South Africa comes 
with responsibilities towards international actors. He argues that the country’s BEE 
policies as it relates to FDI should be construed as reconciling its national interests to 
those in its bilateral and multilateral engagements.831 He argues further, that ensuring 
that equilibrium is reached between interests and various dimensions of FDI in South 
Africa, BEE legislation and policies are part of the broader policy interventions for 
economic transformation in South Africa.832  
 
However, in view of the fact that more than twenty years have passed since the advent 
of democracy in South Africa, the extent and content of the BEE legislation and policies 
are questionable. Will the country reach a point where equilibrium has been 
established between the historically disadvantaged and whites? Are these policies 
meant to be in force for an indefinite period or until such time when the scale is 
balanced? If the answer is indefinitely it begs the question whether South Africa will 
reach a reversed situation in which white citizens might become the historically 
disadvantaged?  
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination833 
provides for proactive measures against racism and provides the basis for future tests 
as to the acceptability of such measures. It follows a holistic approach in this regard 
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and includes the notions of necessity,834 proportionality and time limits for affirmative 
action measures.835 Therefore, international law does recognise racial preferences 
such as the affirmative action; however, it recognises it only as a temporary and not 
permanent notion. 
 
Sibanda admitted in his conclusion that, although his research paper focused on the 
de-internationalisation of Investor-State arbitration, the success of the entire South 
African investment legal framework lies in the maintenance of a conducive investment 
environment in general, that balances national interests and investment concerns.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter was focused on the extent of foreign investment protection in terms of the 
Constitution. Whether the South African legal framework for foreign investment is 
sufficient to provide adequate protection to foreign investors and not deter them from 
investing in South Africa is currently unclear. In as much as there are regulations that 
recognise and protect foreign investors in South Africa, there are many other 
regulations and programmes that limit the protection, such as the BEE and affirmative 
action programmes, and other legislation such as the Expropriation Bill and the 
Protection of Investment Act. Gray-Parker argues that “while seemingly noble in the 
country’s intent to improve economic development, like so many things, the devil is 
arguably in the detail”.836 
 
In the next chapter, the conclusions reached will be summarised. The chapter also 
contains recommendations for improving FDI inflow and economic growth for South 
Africa.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
6.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION  
The first chapter looked at the problem statement of this study. This part of the study 
focused on the issues that confront states when dealing with FDI on both national and 
international level. The first chapter also looked at the investment policy review process 
which South Africa embarked on as a basis of the study. This is because the 
investment review process brought with it many changes to how South Africa will 
subsequently deal with FDI in its territory. For example, South Africa terminated some 
of its BITs and introduced the Protection of Investment Act. Even though the Protection 
of Investment Act is not yet in effect, it was approved by parliament on 15 December 
2015.837 
 
Chapter 1 also looked at various research questions which are fundamental to the 
study. For example, the following questions amongst others were posed: how was 
foreign direct investment regulated in the pre-1994 era in South Africa? What 
encouraged South Africa to introduce the Protection of Investment Act and phase out 
the BITs? Is it possible to have the Protection of Investment Act and BITs operate 
concurrently, and what will be the consequences thereof? Will the Protection of 
Investment Act uphold the constitutional values of South Africa? Does South Africa 
have a beneficiation strategy?  
 
What are the international legal frameworks and standards that South Africa would 
have to comply with in order to enact the Protection of Investment Act? What are the 
international legal frameworks required to regulate FDI in a manner that will promote 
sustainable economic development and protect foreign investment in terms of section 
24 of the Constitution? Why do developing countries with few nationals who are 
unlikely to invest abroad sign investment treaties with developed counties, which have 
the effect of restraining government’s actions in their dealing with foreign investors? 
Will the FDI flow increase if South Africa regulates the investment sector without 
isolating itself from the international investment community? The aims and objectives 
of the study are also dealt with in the first chapter.838 
 
                                                          
837 Chapter 1 page 1-11. 
838 Chapter 1 page 13-13. 
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Chapter 1 also looked at the various definitions of the key concepts that are used. It 
looked at the definitions of “international economic law”, “treaty” and “FDI”.839 It also 
examined the nexus between FDI and economic development and briefly described 
the factors that play a role in influencing FDI. The chapter further introduced the 
principles of international law that are aimed at protecting FDI in the host state.840  
 
The modern FDI is the product of a historical process that has passed through different 
phases of development. Chapter 1 introduced the discussion of BITs by looking at the 
very first BIT that was concluded in 1959, namely the Germany-Pakistan BIT.841 The 
Germany-Pakistan BIT represented the first generation investment treaties. Most of 
these treaties were based on friendship, commerce and navigation. This was the new 
era in international investment law. Soon thereafter, other states began concluding 
BITs with the purpose of promoting and protecting foreign investments in the host 
state.842  
 
These second-generation treaties are BITs, which normally set forth actionable 
standards of conduct that applied to governments with regard to their treatment of 
investors from other states. The BITs were the second development in the investment 
development process and soon thereafter, many states entered into bilateral 
agreements. However, South Africa only concluded its first BIT with the UK in 1994, 
which came into force in 1998.843  
 
Chapter 2 looked at the legal historic development of FDI in South Africa in order to 
ascertain the current legal position of FDI in South Africa.844 This signalled South 
Africa’s interest in being part of the international community, which lent its economy a 
hefty boost. South Africa terminated the UK-SA BIT in 2010.845 In 2010, South Africa 
began the process of drafting the Protection of Investment Act, that was published in 
the Government Gazette on 15 December 2015, but which has not yet come into effect. 
The Protection of Investment Act regulates both domestic and foreign investments in 
                                                          
839 Chapter 1 pages 15-20.  
840 Ibid. 
841 Ibid. 
842 Id at 19-20. 
843 Ibid. 
844 Chapter 2 pages 22-25. 
845 Id at 26. 
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South Africa. The second generation UK-SA BIT made provision for the host state to 
exercise its legal powers when accepting FDI into its territory.846 This allowed the host 
state to define the content and the scope of FDI to be accepted in its territory.  
 
Admittedly, the UK-SA BIT had loopholes that needed to be addressed. For example, 
Article 3 required the contracting states to afford foreign investors national treatment 
without making provisions for reasonable exceptions.847 The termination of BITs by 
South Africa has received a wide range of criticism from different scholars and 
economists. These criticisms are dealt with in detail in Chapter 2 above. The 
termination of the BITs is still worrisome to some investors. The termination of the BITs 
was induced by the Piero Foresti case, 848 which was the first case to challenge directly 
the BITs that South Africa had concluded.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the determinants of foreign investment in the host state. It looked 
at the following factors: country governance and political stability, constitutional right 
to property, potential economic growth, the rule of law, openness and transparency, 
the size of the population, and exchange rate consideration.849 The focus was on the 
importance of these factors, and whether they indeed play a role as determinants of 
FDI inflow.  
 
According to a study undertaken by Luiz and Charalambous, the most important 
factors are the country’s governance and political stability, potential economic growth, 
and openness and transparency of the government. These factors have more than 4 
ratings out of 5. The size of the population scored the least points.850 
 
South Africa has come a long way since the apartheid era. It has developed its laws in 
different fields. However, the country has not yet achieved economic freedom and 
stability,851 and a lot still needs to be done in this regard. At present, South Africa is 
not doing well economically, compared to its counterparts. South Africa has been a 
                                                          
846 Id at 30-33. 
847 Id at 31. 
848 Id 34-41. 
849 Chapter 3 pages 42-58. 
850 Ibid. 
851 The aims and objectives of the study also forms the basis of this study. 
125 
 
democratic state for more than 20 years, but it is still a developing country and so are 
its laws. For this reason, South Africa is currently not in the position to foster 
international relations with other countries, the reason being that its economy is not 
strong enough to handle economic challenges unilaterally. 
  
To a certain extent, South Africa has recognised this need and has attempted to 
remedy this error by enacting the Protection of Investment Act that is aimed at 
regulating foreign investment in South Africa. However, there are many loopholes in 
the Protection of Investment Act that need to be addressed, in order to make it 
attractive to foreign investors. The reason behind the Protection of Investment Act is 
legitimate, namely, to provide a more sophisticated regime for investment in South 
Africa, which will in turn attract more foreign investment.  
 
However, it is submitted that the Protection of Investment Act in its current form will not 
be able to achieve these goals. The loopholes in the Protection of Investment Act, 
other legislation and policies need to be addressed, in order to be in line with the 
international standards of international law. The right of a foreign investor from the pre-
inception stage to post-inception stage must be clearly defined. 
 
The Protection of Investment Act generally limits the rights of foreign investors. This is 
so, despite the fact that these rights are standard at international level in terms of BITs 
and other treaties. An example is the right of a foreign investor to choose the institution 
and the law that will be applicable in the case of a dispute. At international law, the 
parties to a dispute have the autonomy to choose either the domestic law of the host 
state, or the law of another state, or international law. Objectively speaking, this 
approach seems to be preferable, because it is difficult to guarantee the impartiality of 
the presiding officer in a court of the host state. 
 
Even if the presiding officer were to be impartial, the foreign investor would be more 
content to invest in a country where there is an option to choose the law that will be 
applicable in case of a dispute. This should be the sole prerogative of the parties, and 
it should be provided for by both the international law and the domestic law. Therefore, 
it would be preferable if the Protection of Investment Act provided that foreign investors 
can choose the law that will be applicable in a case of a dispute.  
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Like China, South Africa needs a more systematic and stronger protection for foreign 
investors. Both China and South Africa provide for the national treatment of foreign 
investors. However, the nature, scope, content and applicability of the national 
treatment differs between these two jurisdictions. For example, China in its new China 
Draft Investment Law makes provision for the adoption of the pre-establishment 
national treatment principle. This means that foreign investors need not apply for 
approval, unless the investment falls within the parameters of the negative list. In South 
Africa, foreign investors are required to meet certain extra requirements, in addition to 
those that apply to domestic investors, before they can establish an investment in 
South Africa.  
 
Chapter 4 focused on the protection of FDI in accordance with the rules and principles 
of international law.852 The chapter commenced by looking at the legal relationship 
between the host state and the foreign investor, which is based on key factors such as 
consent, transparency, and impartiality of domestic and international courts, effective 
remedies and an overall strong framework for international investment law. These 
factors also form the basis of standard provisions of BITs. Chapter 4 further described 
how FDI is protected in terms of international investment law from the investor’s point 
of view. The International Minimum Standard Treatment853 is directly linked to the 
reasonable protection of FDI. This is because the reasonableness of the protection of 
foreign investment in the host state depends on whether the foreign investor has been 
granted an international minimum acceptable treatment by the host state.  
 
The international minimum acceptable treatment is based on many principles in the 
field of international investment law, such contractual guarantees and IMST, aimed at 
protecting and promoting FDI. Examples of contractual guarantees are the stabilisation 
clause, the renegotiation clause, the umbrella clause, the governing law clause and 
the expropriation clause. Examples of IMST are the Most Favoured Nation854 standard, 
the full protection and security standard, the national treatment standard, and the Fair 
                                                          
852 Chapter 4 pages 59-100. 
853 International Minimum Standard Treatment (hereinafter refer to as the IMST). 
854 Most Favoured Nation Treatment Standard (hereinafter referred to the MFN). 
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and Equitable Treatment855 standard. Some of these principles form basic provisions 
of BITs and are contained in the Protection of Investment Act.  
 
Generally, the parties agree to all the terms and conditions of the agreement. This 
includes the law that will be applicable to the parties, whether in a case of a dispute 
before a domestic or international court, and the effective remedies that both parties 
are entitled to. The due processes of international investment law are also dealt with 
in Chapter 4. This part of the study looked at the nature, scope and content of investor-
state dispute resolution mechanisms. The International Court of Justice,856 the arbitral 
tribunal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes857 are institutions that are tasked with dispute resolution at the 
international level. At the regional level, the SADC tribunal is also tasked with resolving 
disputes. However, a foreign investor may refer the matter to these institutions only if 
the domestic law makes provision for it, as is the case in South Africa.858 
 
China was used as an example to demonstrate how domestic investment law can be 
successfully developed. It serves as a perfect example, because it is a developing 
country, is part of BRICS, and, like South Africa is also in the process of reviewing its 
investment law. The six factors that influence FDI in China were discussed in detail in 
this chapter, as well as the nature and the content of protection of FDI in China.859 
China’s due processes were strengthened by its notice to the ICSID Secretariat that it 
would only agree to refer issues of compensation for expropriation to ICSID arbitration, 
and that consent for arbitration would be given on a case-by-case basis.860 In this 
regard, China ensured that subsequent treaties signed in the following years included 
the ICSID arbitration clause in line with this notice. 
 
The last part of Chapter 4 dealt with international institutions that play a role in the 
promotion of FDI. The UN, the GA, the UN Commission on International Trade Law, 
the IMF and the World Bank all play a role in protecting and promoting FDI at an 
                                                          
855 Fair and Equitable Treatment (hereinafter referred to as the FET). 
856The International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the ICJ). 
857 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the 
ICSID). 
858 Chapter 4 pages 80-84. 
859 Id at 92-97. 
860 Id at 88-89. 
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international level.861 The international principles, rules, standards, mechanisms and 
institutions collectively ensure that FDI is properly regulated, and that the foreign 
investor is protected from the pre-inception stage to the dispute resolution stage. All 
these factors are at the root of international investment law. Therefore, South Africa 
would benefit immensely if the international investment law, principles, standards, 
mechanisms and institutions were to apply equally to domestic investment law. 
 
Chapter 5 looked at the protection and promotion of FDI in accordance with the South 
African law. The discussion commenced with the recognition of international law by the 
Constitution, as well as the rights and obligations of the foreign investor.862 As stated 
above, the South African government has nationalised its FDI legal framework, and 
foreign investment is currently fully regulated in terms of South African law. It regulates 
FDI from the pre-inception stage, during the investment process and up to the dispute 
resolution stage. In terms of the Protection of Investment Act, foreign investors do not 
have a right of establishment of investment.863 There are no exceptions to this rule.  
 
The Protection of Investment Act claims to afford similar treatment to foreign investors 
as compared to domestic investors. However, the truth is that in a practical sense, 
foreign investors will never be in a similar position as domestic investors. The reason 
is that there are policies such as BEE and affirmative action, which favour historically 
disadvantaged persons. This means that if the right of a foreign investor is in conflict 
with the right of a domestic investor, the domestic investor will always have preference. 
However, the Protection of Investment Act has also included some of the common 
provisions of BITs, such as the national treatment and the fair administrative treatment, 
which is similar to FET. The Protection of Investment Act also provides for the 
repatriation of property by the investor.  
 
The worrisome provisions in the Protection of Investment Act are the expropriation 
clause and the dispute resolution clause. With regard to expropriation, the Protection 
of Investment Act states that the Constitution is applicable. The Constitution does 
                                                          
861 Id at 97-100.  
862 Chapter 5 pages 102-122. 
863 Id at 107-108. 
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provide for the protection of property against expropriation, but it makes provision for 
the expropriation of property in certain circumstances.  
 
With regard to the dispute resolution mechanism, the foreign investor is required to 
exhaust all domestic remedies before a matter can be taken to international arbitration. 
Therefore, foreign investors are required to take the matter to domestic courts before 
they can refer it to an international forum. This provision may tend to be worrisome to 
some investors because it further defeats the principle of impartiality, as the judicial 
officer is a national of the host state. The laws applicable in the case of a dispute are 
the laws of the host state and not international law.  
 
Both national and international law are very important in shaping the domestic affairs 
of any country. For this reason, one cannot apply the one to the exclusion of the other 
in matters on an international level, such as the FDI. It is, therefore, important to 
develop both the national and the international law in such a way that they apply 
concurrently in different circumstances.  
 
Therefore, the question is, how then does one balance the national interest of the 
country and that of the foreign investor? For example, there are policies in South Africa 
that cannot be ignored, such as the BEE and affirmative action policies. The main aim 
of these policies is to protect the interests of historically disadvantaged persons in 
South Africa. The conflict between the interests of historically disadvantaged and 
foreign investors were illustrated in the Piero Forresti case. This case illustrated how 
disputes may arise, if the laws of the host state are not properly aligned with the rights 
of foreign investors. Therefore, it is important to balance the interest of foreign investors 
on one hand and the interests of South African nationals on the other.  
 
Unlike BITs, which are in force only for the duration of the agreement, all legislation in 
South Africa is in force for an indefinite period. This means that all laws are in force 
until they are repealed. Therefore, all legislation that regulates foreign investors and 
their investments will apply until legally challenged and thereafter repealed. South 
Africa has not yet reached a stage in its development where its economy can survive 
without outside assistance such as FDI. South Africa needs FDI to increase its 
economic development, which has been deteriorating for the past few years due to 
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different factors, such as a drastic change in the investment legal framework, 
corruption and unsteady government, to name but a few. However, the economy of 
South Africa may grow further, and over a relatively short period of time, if the 
government re-evaluates its laws and policies. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is important to note that South Africa does have international agreements and 
relations in place with other states. However, the agreements for specifically protecting 
and promoting foreign investments are currently not renewed when the period of the 
agreement expires. Section 15(1) of the Protection of Investment Act states that 
existing investments that were made under BITs will continue to be protected for the 
period and terms stipulated in the treaties. However, section 15(2) further stipulates 
that any investments made after the termination of BITs, but before the promulgation 
of the Protection of Investment Act, will be governed by the general South African law.  
 
In this regard, the following recommendations that could have a positive effect on the 
country’s economic growth are made. Firstly, the fact that South Africa has terminated 
some of the BITs creates the impression that it is voluntarily isolating itself from the 
international investment community. Instead of terminating the second generation 
BITs, the government could renegotiate them under different terms, in order to align 
them with the changing needs of the country. This will ensure that South Africa will 
benefit more from BITs and boost its economy.  
 
Second, although the South African law and the country’s judicial systems are solid 
and sophisticated, they could still be complemented by international investment law. 
Looking at it from the foreign investor’s perspective, section 13 of the Protection of 
Investment Act may be worrisome to some investors. This section requires the foreign 
investor to obtain consent from the Minster of the Department of Trade and Industry 
before a matter can be elevated to the international investment arbitration in a case of 
a dispute. To resolve this issue, it would be better if the foreign investor were afforded 
an opportunity to choose whether to take the matter to a South African court, or an 
international investment forum.  
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Lastly, the IMST principles are one of the tools that may make a country an investor-
friendly jurisdiction. These principles also form part of the common provisions of BITs 
and provide adequate protection to foreign investors in the host state. Therefore, the 
Protection of Investment Act should incorporate these principles with the aim of 
providing the same or better protection than is available at the international level. 
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